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To The Corporate Pilot Who Suffers From Substance Abuse & Dependence
 
  
ABSTRACT 
Safety is a critical issues facing aviation today.  The health of the pilot and the 
policies related to pilot well-being greatly contribute to the safety practices of flight.  The 
purpose of this research study was to assess the status quo of unmandated, written alcohol 
and drug policies of corporate/executive flight departments operating under Part 91 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).  Researchers found 68% of these operators had 
written general alcohol/drug, 20% had rehabilitation and 15% had job retention/recovery 
policies in place.  Statistical tests showed that for each pilot added to the flight operation 
the odds of having a general alcohol/drug policy in place increased by 1.4 times.  A 
strong statistical connectivity was uncovered between how important the policy is 
perceived to be by the leader and whether or not written policies are in place.   
 Ultimately, this data supports that a need exists for further education of industry 
professionals of the resources available.  The vast majority (94%) of leaders were 
unaware of resources or where to obtain them and nearly one-quarter reported having 
direct experience with these issues among the pilots in their flight operations.  
Furthermore, our research was an endeavor to aid those in our industry affected by 
substance abuse and dependence issues.  Finally, this study upholds the aviation 
industry’s goal of achieving increased safety by establishing industry best practices of 
instituting written alcohol and drug policies. 
  
 
 
x
  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the post September 11th 2001 economy of the business aviation 
industry has experienced tremendous growth both in more efficient utilization of aircraft 
and expansion of new and existing flight operations.  Industry exerts speculate this 
growth is driven by a combination of growing national economy, degraded convenience 
of commercial airline travel, and the increased emphasis on safety, security and 
efficiency to the business traveler.  The ensuing decade projections show that business 
aviation will only continue to strengthen with a booming economic forecast.  Richard 
Aboulafia of the Teal Group, an aerospace and defense industry consulting and analysis 
firm projects delivery of 12,000 business jets worth $173.2 billion in 2007 dollars 
through the next 10 years (2007-2016). Additionally, these projections do not include 424 
corporate jetliners and regional jets worth an additional $12.3 billion (Burnside, 2007).  
Furthermore, while experiencing industry segment expansion corporate/executive 
and business aircraft operators thus far have accumulated the best safety records of any 
segment of General Aviation.  In fact, recently corporate/executive operators (a sub-
population of business aviation) have compiled a safety record comparable to that of 
scheduled FAR Part 121 airlines, which historically has experienced the lowest rate of 
accidents in aviation.  Corporate aviation (defined by safety analyst Robert E. Breiling 
Associates as all aircraft types flown for business by salaried crews) had its safest year in
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2003 in terms of accident rates (accidents per 100,000 flight hours) and its safety record 
was better than the scheduled airlines in every year during the last decade (Gilbert, 2006). 
However, corporate/executive (professionally flown) aviation continues to 
experience safety challenges.  In the first nine months of 2005 business aviation aircraft 
where involved in 48 accidents, 13 which were responsible for 43 deaths (Business 
Aviation, 2005). Contrarily, in 2003, statistics show that one of the best 
corporate/executive (professionally flown) accident records ever – 0.028 accidents and 
0.014 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours.  Business aviation (non-professionally 
flown) compiled in 2003 its best record ever – 0.95 accidents per 100,000 flight hours 
(NBAA, 2004b).  In personal communications with Robert E. Breiling Associates, FAR 
Part 91 Corporate/Executive flight operations which comprise more than 25,000 jets and 
turboprops experienced per 100,000 flight hours an overall accident rate of 0.14 and a 
0.011 fatal accident rate in 2006.  Although historically corporate/executive operations 
have compiled an accident rate comparable to the airlines, the business aviation 
community has seen a dramatic increase in media exposure of high profile accidents.  
The media in the United States is particularly fascinated with high net-worth individuals 
and celebrities which are serviced by business aviation.  This coupled with continued 
fatal and non-fatal accidents and incidents, and increased negative media exposure 
regarding the safety of the business aviation community, it is important for the growing 
community of business aviation to examine the reasons for accidents and incidents.   
For aviation as a whole, at the root of most accidents and incidents is the human 
factor.  According to a study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO),  
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While a broad range of factors contribute to general aviation accidents, the 
majority of them are associated with pilot error.  According to our analysis of the 
National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) accident data, 80 percent of the 
fatal accidents and 72 percent of the nonfatal accidents that occurred between 
1994 and 1998 involved pilot error.  Previous studies have found that between 60 
and 80 percent of general aviation accidents are associated with pilot error (GAO, 
2001).   
This statistic uses primary causal factors to determine human error but does not 
include human error that was a secondary or latent error casual factor.  When this statistic 
is examined from the narrowed perspective inclusive of the latent error, the statistic of 80 
percent of aircraft accidents attributed to human error is likely a conservatively low 
figure. 
One issue within the human factors arena that is of particular concern is the use of 
drugs and alcohol among the pilot population.  Great strides in national policy and 
education have been made by the FAA in the area of alcohol and drugs.  In the last 40 
years, general aviation accidents directly attributable to alcohol and drugs using have 
dropped significantly.  According to Lacefield, fatal civilian aviation accidents for 1968-
74 showed 19.5 percent of deceased pilots revealed a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) level 
of 15mg% (Lacefield, 1975).  In a later study, Ross and Ross reported a statistical review 
of the NTSB’s accident reports involving alcohol.  In that review, it was found that for 
the period 1975-1981, 10.5 percent of fatally injured general aviation pilots were 
conclusively alcohol positive (Ross, 1988).  In the latest data received May 2007 in 
personal communications with the NTSB, four accidents in the last 10 years (1997-2006) 
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have involved reportable substances specific to the corporate/executive flight operations 
sector. 
The corporate/executive segment of general aviation continues to prosper, while it 
experiences one of the lowest accident rates in the industry.  Furthermore, the trend data 
of accidents and incidents show a decreasing reported toxicology as a casual factor.  
However, little is known about corporate/executive operators’ internal company policies 
and programs regarding drugs and alcohol.  Professor Christopher Cook of the University 
of Kent indicated in his 1997 survey of commercial aviation policies on alcohol and 
drugs says, “In the aviation environment, there certainly has not been a failure to form 
policy, nor has there been evidence that policies are ineffective.  However, there does 
appear to have been a failure to subject such policies to scientific study,” (Cook, 1997). 
Even in the midst of positive economic trends and decreasing accidents, corporate 
flight operations and their pilots are not immune to substance abuse issues.  According to 
Dr. Quay Snyder, statistically, drug and alcohol abuse affects the pilot population in the 
same proportion as other professional occupations – approximately 8-to 10 percent.  The 
major concern however is that the majority of abusers are undiscovered and under 
reported.  
Dr. Snyder in his article FAA-Sanctioned Pilot Alcohol Abuse Programs in 
Business Aviation points out that,  
Alcohol and other substances that affect the mind impair the ability to think 
clearly, react quickly, anticipate dynamic environments and handle complex tasks.  
Effective Crew Resource Management (CRM) activities are inhibited by the 
rigidity in decision-making and self-centered behavior of the alcoholic.  Even the 
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pilot who is completely sober is plagued by decreased mental function and 
abilities months after the removal of alcohol.  The compromised abilities are often 
so subtle as not to be noticed, but remain very significant in the complex, multi-
tasking world of aviation (Snyder, 2004). 
According to the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute’s Alcohol and Flying, 
approximately 12 percent of all pilots in fatal general aviation accidents over a seven year 
period had measurable amounts of alcohol in their blood at the time of their death.  
Potentially however, fatal accidents do occur as a result of pilots who have been impaired 
by the after effects of alcohol or drugs which can not be measured in the bloodstream 
post-mortem (Civil Aeromedical Institute, n.d.). 
Problem 
 Many U.S. commercial carriers have voluntarily instituted written company 
policies and programs addressing drug and alcohol that also include rehabilitation and job 
recovery programs of aircrew members since the mid 1970’s.  Since that time there has 
been a steady increase in the use and success of these programs.  However, in the 
business aviation sector of FAR Part 91 corporate/executive operations, there is little 
known about the quantity and quality of internal policies addressing alcohol and drugs, 
including those which may address the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery programs 
for pilots.  There are notable differences in the cultural environments between the 
commercial and corporate/executive flying that may be attributing factors to this 
knowledge base.  Some of these differences between these industry segments include 
market size, density and maturity; amount of regulatory oversight; required 
corporate/personnel privacy and security; limited access to and availability of this type of 
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flying; and the mission: revenue generating versus organizational support (business cost 
center).  Additionally, although substance abuse is thought to not vary dependent upon 
profession or subpopulation, statistical information of reported frequency is available 
from commercial carriers which have these voluntary policies and programs.  Little is 
known about the frequency of suspicion and addressing professional pilot substance 
abuse and dependency in FAR Part 91 corporate/executive operations.  More data is 
required.  
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
For U.S. FAR Part 91 corporate/executive flight operations: 
1) What is the prevalence of written alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery) policies for pilots in place? 
2) How important are having written alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery) policies for pilots in place to leaders? 
3) What is the prevalence of leaders’ suspicion of and/or addressing alcohol/drug 
issues with pilots? 
4) How familiar are leaders with the FAA’s HIMS program? 
5) How receptive are leaders to implementing an alcohol/drug policy that 
includes job retention/recovery and rehabilitation components? 
6) What factors predict whether or not a flight operation has a written 
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policy for 
pilots in place? 
This research study expects to find that through quantitative analysis that the 
existence of written alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job 
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retention/recovery) is influenced by certain factors.  More specifically, it is proposed that 
researchers will find that those flight operations that are larger in size, as defined by the 
number of pilots, will have written policies in place.  Additionally, researchers speculate 
that leaders who report these policies as being of higher importance will be more likely to 
have these respective written policies in place.  It is also proposed that those leaders who 
report having suspected and/or addressed an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in their flight 
operation will be more likely to have written policies in place.  Furthermore, it is 
hypothesized that leaders who are more familiar with the HIMS program and report a 
being receptive to implementing a policy for the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery 
of pilots are more likely to have these policies in place. 
  This research study expects to find common themes in the sample through 
qualitative analysis.  In general researchers speculate that the leaders’ discussions of their 
attitudes toward alcohol/drug policies are grounded in Zero Tolerance and the Moral 
Model of Addiction.   
  In reviewing alcohol/drug policies to be submitted, most prevalently researchers 
expect to see general alcohol/drug policies in the flight operation that are based upon a 
reiteration and expansion of FAA regulatory guidelines.  It is anticipated that some 
policies will contain guidance on the use of substances and outline the consequences of 
use outside of these guidelines.  Additionally, the Principal Investigator expects to see 
drug testing policies referenced, specifically in conjunction with an aircraft incidents or 
accidents.  Overall, the study expects to find more comprehensive and robust policies to 
be found in larger flight operations. 
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Significance of Study 
 Evidence suggests that the prevalence of substance abuse among the professional 
pilot population as a whole is no greater than the general population (Snyder, 2003).  
However the potentially great costs (financial and human) of incidents and accidents, 
would suggest that it is imperative to evaluate and understand the scope of substance 
abuse within the professional pilot community flying in corporate/executive flight 
operations.  Furthermore, the great costs suggest that it is important to create, maintain 
and improve effective policies which are designed to protect both employees and 
passengers alike.  Without such policies that allow for self-disclosure to obtain help and 
retain/recover jobs, substance abuse and dependence are forced underground and in many 
cases go undetected thereby increasing risk and the potential for safety breeches.   
To the researcher’s knowledge no study addressing these issues has ever been 
conducted of the professional pilot community within FAR Part 91 corporate/executive 
operations.  While we can generalize findings from other segments of aviation within the 
professional pilot community as a whole, such as commercial and military operations, it 
is important to recognize that the operating environment is different from other segments.  
Identifying this fact, it is possible that findings of this study may vary from the general 
population and of the professional pilot community at large.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature review will include four areas: (a) definitions of alcohol and drug 
abuse and dependence, the prevalence of this fact in the general population and aviation 
community and related aviation accident rates, (b) studies of the relationship of 
alcohol/drug related driving violations and aircraft accidents, (c) studies of related 
aviation alcohol/drug policies, (d) a review of the Human Intervention Motivation Study 
(HIMS) which addresses the issue of alcohol/drug policy and program for pilot 
rehabilitation and job recovery.  Finally, conclusions are drawn about what is known and 
unknown regarding general alcohol and drug policies, rehabilitation policies and job 
retention/recovery policies within the corporate/executive aviation community. 
Pilots - Alcohol/Drug Abuse and Dependence 
Pilots who abuse or are dependent upon alcohol or other chemical substances face 
severe consequences including loss of medical certificates, pilot licenses, termination of 
employment, legal problems, grave medical conditions and death.  Organizations which 
have corporate/executive flight operations are also potentially threatened by increased 
negative media exposure, loss of revenue, compromised safety, and potential aircraft 
incidents and accidents.   Additionally, incidents and accidents can result in loss of assets, 
loss of life and leadership of professionals and high net worth executives and open the 
door to civil and criminal litigation.  The culmination of each of these factors results in 
severe potential costs to the individual and organization. 
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The review of literature includes information about substance abuse and 
dependence.  There is substantial information published about alcohol and drug abuse 
and dependence.  Furthermore, a literature review was conducted of aviation specific 
information regarding substance abuse and dependence and subsequent programs for 
addressing these issues for pilots. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledges the value of 
education, intervention, treatment and return to flying duties for pilots afflicted by this 
common, progressive, fatal, but treatable disease.  The FAA has accepted the definition 
of substance abuse/dependence provided by the medical community and published by the 
Joint Committee of the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and the 
American Society of Addiction Medicine as being, 
Alcoholism is a primary chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and 
environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations. The 
disease is often progressive and fatal.  It is characterized by impaired control over 
drinking, preoccupation with the drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse 
consequences, and distortions in thinking, mostly denial. Each of these symptoms 
may be continuous or periodic (Morse, 1992). 
In, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism, Dr. Elvin Jellinek, describes alcoholics as 
individuals with tolerance, withdrawal symptoms, and either "loss of control" or 
"inability to abstain" from alcohol. He maintained that the alcoholic could not drink in 
moderation, and, with continued drinking, the disease was progressive and life-
threatening. Jellinek also recognized that some features of the alcoholic disease where 
inability to abstain and loss of control were shaped by cultural factors.  
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 Since Jellinek’s book was published in 1960, numerous studies by behavioral and 
social scientists have supported his assertion that alcoholism is a disease. In fact, previous 
to his book’s release, The American Medical Association supported the concept of 
alcoholism as a disease in 1957. The American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Hospital Association, the American Public Health Association, the National Association 
of Social Workers, the World Health Organization and the American College of 
Physicians have subsequently classified alcoholism as a disease. In the 1970s, 
researchers’ conclusions led to the formulation of determining criteria for an "alcohol 
dependence syndrome" (Hobbs, 1998). 
Alcoholism is widely recognized as a progressive, fatal disease process beyond 
the control of an individual, not a weakness in character.  Alcoholism has specific causes, 
a predictable course and responds to treatment.  Untreated, it causes premature death, 
reduced productivity and may compromise aviation safety.  With proper treatment, most 
alcoholics will have full and sustained remission.  The result is improved health, social 
relationships, job performance and enhanced aviation safety (Snyder, 2003).  
The National Institute for Alcoholism Research has estimated that roughly 7 
percent of people in the general population who drink or use drugs may become 
chemically dependent.  Alcohol abuse and dependence affects approximately 5-8 percent 
of all pilots, similar to the proportions in other professional occupations such as law, 
medicine and ministry. 
The disease does not discriminate among professions, socioeconomic classes, 
gender, age, education levels or other factors.  Nationwide, approximately 13 percent of 
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those diagnosed with alcoholism are employed in professional/technical careers (Snyder, 
2003). 
The FAA defines a substance as, “alcohol; other sedatives and hypnotics; 
anxiolytics; opioids; central nervous system stimulants such as cocaine, amphetamines, 
and similarly acting sympathomimetics; hallucinogens; phencyclidines or similarly acting 
arycyclohexyamines; cannabis; inhalants; and other psychoactive drugs and chemicals” 
(14 CFR 67.107, 207, 307).   
The FAA defines Substance Abuse as any event within the preceding two years: 
(1)   Use of a substance in a situation in which the use has been 
physically hazardous, if there has been at any other time and instance of a 
substance also in a situation in which that use was physically hazardous; 
(2)   A verified positive drug test result conducted under an anti-drug 
rule or internal program or the U.S. Department of Transportation or any 
other Administration within the Department of Transportation; 
(3)   Misuse of a substance that the Federal Air Surgeon, based on case 
history and appropriate, qualified medical judgment relating to the 
substance involved, finds – 
(i)      Makes the person unable to safely perform the duties or exercise 
the privileges of the airman certificate applied for or held; or 
(ii)    May reasonably be expected, for the maximum duration of the 
airman medical certificate applied for or held, to make the person unable 
to perform those duties or exercise those privileges” (14 CFR 67.107, 207 
and 307). 
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The FAA defines Substance Dependence as a condition in which a person 
is dependent on a substance, other than tobacco or ordinary xanthine-
containing beverages (e.g., caffeine) beverages as evidenced by: 
(A) Increased Tolerance; 
(B)  Manifestation of withdrawal symptoms; 
(C) Impaired control of use; or 
(D) Continued use despite damage to physical health or impairment of social, 
personal, or occupational functioning” (14 CFR 67.107, 207 and 307). 
 The above definition is rather broad.  Many circumstances that people may not 
associate with substance dependence would meet the FAA definition.  Examples include: 
a. Walking and driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.20 mg/dl  (Increased 
tolerance);  
b. Delirium Tremens (DTs’), fast heart rates and irritability (Manifestations of 
withdrawal symptoms); 
c. Drinking more than 5 drinks at a time (binging) or having an “eye opener” 
(Impaired control) 
d. Drinking despite liver test abnormalities, domestic abuse complaints associated 
with alcohol, divorce or use of sick leave due to hangovers or blackouts (Snyder, 
2003).  
The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) reports in its publication Alcohol 
and Flying, approximately 12 percent of all pilots in fatal general aviation accidents over 
a seven year period had measurable levels of alcohol in their bloodstream at the time of 
their death.  
 
 
13
  
General aviation has not compiled such an incident/accident-free record (as the 
airlines).  Although the rate of alcohol-related accidents is very low, their results 
are almost always lethal. From 1996-2001 the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) reported that 33 aircraft accidents were determined to be alcohol-
related. Approximate 70 percent of those accidents involved fatalities where in 
total thirty-six people died.  Only two cases reported any occupant escaping 
unharmed (Ibold, 2002). 
Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine reported that approximately 7 
percent of U.S. adults are alcoholics.  From this statistic, in 1983 Cromwell 
concluded that, "Perhaps as many as 10 percent were either alcoholics or victims 
of problem drinking. The U.S. has about 750,000 licensed airmen. Over 60,000 of 
these are airline transport pilots, 200,000 are commercial pilots, and the 
remainders are private pilots. Statistically, this would produce a potential of 
75,000 problem drinkers in U.S. airmen," (Cromwell, 1983). 
According to the Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI), a division of the FAA, 
identifying pilots who have suffered the latent effects of alcohol and drugs but no trace 
amounts are found in the bloodstream are much more difficult to identify.  Even after 
complete elimination of all of the alcohol in the body, there are undesirable effects-
hangover-that can last 48 to 72 hours following the last drink.  The hangover effect as 
produced by alcoholic beverages after the acute intoxication has worn off, and Blood 
Alcohol Content (BAC) has been restored to 0.00 may potentially be just as dangerous as 
the intoxication itself. A pilot with hangover effect symptoms such as headache, 
dizziness, dry mouth, stuffy nose, fatigue, upset stomach, irritability, impaired judgment, 
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and increased sensitivity to bright light would not be fit to fly.  The hangover effect in a 
pilot would qualify as being "under the influence of alcohol" (FAA Civil Aeromedical 
Institute, n.d.).   
The rate of alcohol elimination is essentially constant for an average, healthy 
person despite the total amount of alcohol consumed.   The rate of elimination of pure 
alcohol is fairly constant, approximately 1/3 to 1/2 oz. of pure alcohol per hour. In 
layman’s terms, the rate of elimination is the same whether a person consumes low to 
high amounts of alcohol. Thus, the more alcoholic beverages a person takes in, the 
increased amount of time it takes that person to eliminate it from his/her system.  The 
brain, eyes, and inner ear are significantly affected by the alcohol in the body.  Each of 
these body systems is critical to a pilot.  Impaired reaction time, reasoning, judgment, and 
memory are some of the results of alcohol on the brain. The brain is limited in its ability 
to efficiently use oxygen as a result of alcohol in the body.  In the air potentially hypoxic 
situations can be magnified due to simultaneous exposure to altitude, characterized by a 
decreased partial pressure of oxygen. Visual symptoms are impaired through eye muscle 
imbalance, leading to double vision and focusing difficulties.  Vestibular or inner ear 
difficulties arise resulting in dizziness and decreased hearing perception. Compound the 
situation with normally occurring environmental factors such as sleep deprivation, 
fatigue, medication use, altitude hypoxia, or flying at night or in bad weather, the 
negative effects can be exponential (FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute, n.d.). 
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Study of Driving Convictions and Aircraft Accidents/Incidents 
In a study conducted by Kathleen McFadden, a researcher at Northern Illinois 
University, she studied the driving and flying records of over 70,000 airline pilots over a 
seven-year period, 1986-1992.  The results of her study which cross referenced the 
National Driver Register with the NTSB’s aircraft incident/accident database were 
sobering. 
Traffic tickets can be a frequent warning sign of substance abuse.   Speeding and 
other moving violations may be associated with substance use even legally unintoxicated.  
McFadden attempted to identify a correlation between pilots who are caught driving 
under the influence and one’s who have had an aircraft incident or accident.  
Her results showed that those pilots who had received a Driving While 
Intoxicated (DWI) or Driving Under the Influence (DUI) violation were more likely to 
have had an aircraft incident or accident.  The findings showed that out of 70,164 pilots 
there were 68,792 that had no DWI/DUI convictions.  However, 1,281 pilots had one 
DWI/DUI conviction and 91 had 2 or more DWI/DUI convictions.  In total from 1986-
1992 there were 259 aircraft incident/accidents which represents 0.37 percent of the total 
airline pilot population and 246 aircraft incident/accidents for those pilots who did not 
have any DWI/DUI violations.  Unfortunately though, for those pilots who did receive a 
DWI/DUI violation the results showed that there were 11 aircraft accidents (0.86 percent) 
for those who had one violation and 2 aircraft accidents (2.20 percent) for those pilots 
who had two or more DWI/DUI convictions.  These results show a history one DWI/DUI 
conviction was associated with double the risk of a pilot-error accident. Two or more 
convictions more than quadrupled the risk -- this despite the fact that no pilot tested 
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positive for alcohol during any post-accident investigation during the study period.  The 
good news is that 98 percent of the airline pilot population had no convictions of a 
DWI/DUI. 
However, of particular interest is in the 13 cases in which a pilot had both a 
DWI/DUI conviction and a pilot-error accident, the DWI/DUI preceded the airplane 
crash 10 times. Recognizably, these numbers are small and some may view them as 
insignificant.  The researcher however used a generous statistical threshold for 
significance because of the public-safety aspect involved.  
Although the FAA now systematically queries the National Driver Register each 
time an airman applies for a medical certificate.  The results of this study raise an 
important question as to whether a DWI/DUI conviction should be causation to 
administer a substance abuse/dependence assessment.  Additionally, because of the 
variance time to exercise the privileges of Class 1, 2 and 3 medical certificates, airmen 
are screened inconsistently.   
McFadden’s study also showed there was no evidence to support the concept that 
random alcohol testing is a preventative measure.  Random testing may have acted as 
some form of deterrent for other pilots (McFadden, 1998).   
In 2002, a follow-up study was conducted by Professor McFadden to assess the 
success of the FAA’s program that was instituted to deal with pilots convicted of 
DWI/DUI’s.  Prior to 1990, the FAA did not take any action against pilots with 
DWI/DUI convictions unless they did not disclose them on their application for a medical 
certificate.  The new FAA program cross-references the National Driver Register with 
those pilots applying for a new medical certificate.  If a pilot receives two or more 
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DWI/DUI convictions within a three year period, s/he can have his/her pilot’s license 
revoked. 
The follow-up research studied a five-year period prior to the new rules (1986-
1990) and five years after the new rules took effect (1993-1997).  The results showed that 
from 1986-1990; 1,478 pilots (0.97 percent) were convicted of a DWI/DUI.  From 1993-
1997; 2,593 pilots (1.62 percent) were convicted of a DWI/DUI.  Disturbingly, 
McFadden found 29 airline pilots with four DWI/DUI convictions, six with five 
convictions and three with six.  During the period in which the new FAA screening was 
instituted, as the convictions of DWI/DUI’s rose in airline pilots, nationwide in the 
general population during that same period DWI/DUI convictions dropped by 20 percent.  
She noted that her finding showed 463 pilots that had multiple convictions during the 10 
year study period, most of which evaded FAA penalties.  The percentage of pilots with 
more than one DWI/DUI also increased, going from 0.08 percent to 0.13 percent.  
The researcher concluded the FAA's reporting requirements and sanctions against 
pilots with DWI/DUI convictions was ineffective as a deterrent and that it has not 
reduced the probability of pilots receiving an initial DWI/DUI violation or subsequent 
convictions.  Unfortunately, the proportion of the pilots receiving DWI/DUI convictions 
has actually increased during the five-year period studies in which the FAA’s new 
screening program was in place.  
  McFadden cites that the FAA’s program would be more effective if action were 
taken the first time a pilot received a DUI.  Again this evidence supports the concept that 
pilot’s should be evaluated for a substance abuse/dependence problem upon receiving a 
DWI/DUI conviction.  This process may save lives and careers (King, 2002). 
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Study of Airline Alcohol/Drug Policies 
In a 1994-1995 study of air carrier alcohol and drug policies conducted by 
Christopher Cook of the Kent Institute of Medicine and Health Science Department at the 
University of Kent in Canterbury, UK 194 airlines were invited to participate.  Ninety-
two carriers responded to the survey (24 UK and 68 other countries) equating to an 
overall response rate of 47 percent.  Surveys were addressed to the Senior Occupational 
Physician however many respondents were from Chief Pilots and company executives.  
Six yes/no format questions were presented as to whether the airline had a company 
policy regarding: 
1) Alcohol consumption by aircrew prior to flight. 
2) Illicit drug use by aircrew. 
3) Use of prescribed and ‘over the counter’ medication by aircrew. 
4) Screening of aircrew for alcohol/drug misuse. 
5) Prevention of alcohol/drug misuse among aircrew. 
6) Management of alcohol misuse in aircrew. 
The results of question one showed that 76 (82.6 percent) have a company policy on 
alcohol, 12 (13.0 percent) have no company policy but revert to their respective 
aviation authority policy, and finally 4 (4.4 percent) have no policy.  Question 2 
showed the following results: 62 (67.4 percent) have a company policy, 10 (10.9 
percent) rely on the aviation authority’s policy and 20 (21.7 percent) have no policy.  
In question three airlines responded that 70 (76.1 percent) have a company policy, 7 
(7.6 percent) hold the aviation authority’s policy, and 15 (16.3 percent) have no 
policy.  Question 4’s screening policy revealed that 18 (19.3 percent) had a company 
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policy, 6 (6.6 percent) held the aviation authority’s policy, and 67 (72.8 percent) had 
no screening policy.  Prevention policies in place at these airlines showed that 27 
(30.0 percent) had a company policy, 4 (4.3) relied on the aviation authority policy, 
and 59 (64.1 percent) had no policy for screening.  Finally, airlines showed that in the 
management of alcohol misuse by aircrew 26 (29.5 percent) had a policy, 7 (8.0 
percent) reverted to the aviation authority, and 55 (59.8 percent) had no policy.  To 
summarize the majority of responding airlines surveyed have company policies 
covering the use of alcohol, illicit and prescribed/over the counter drugs by aircrew.  
However, only a minority of airlines have a company policy that address screening, 
prevention, and management of alcohol and drug issues. 
In this study, the author concludes that in many cases the question regarding 
prevention policies were likely unclear and misunderstood.  Mr. Cook even speculates 
that the respondents failed to understand the distinction between policies of prevention of 
drug and alcohol abuse/dependence and reactive policies.   
This survey included a request to responding airlines to provide a copy of written 
alcohol/drug policies.  This allowed the researchers to further qualitatively analyze the 
dichotomous variables in the questions provided. 
 The results of this study show that almost all airlines have some type of 
alcohol/drug policy for pilots.  The author concludes that this reflects a perception that 
these policies are necessary and important relevant to the serious safety risk involved.  
Alternatively, few airlines have taken more than general measures to screen, prevent and 
manage alcohol/drug problems in pilots.  As the author acknowledges, this survey failed 
to appropriately define or clarify the difference to the survey respondents.  This 
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information is subsequently supported by the qualitative information submitted in the few 
written policies submitted. 
Mr. Cook speculates how the policies described in the study might be applied in 
other areas of aviation that have a higher documented incidence of alcohol/drug related 
incidents and accidents.  This study forms a basis for further investigation of alcohol/drug 
policies in other parts of aviation given improvement in clarification of the survey 
questions (Cook, 1997). 
Pilots in Recovery 
“The FAA supports programs that lead the alcoholic aviator to recovery.  This 
recovery program encourages the airman to self-identify, promotes rehabilitation, and 
ultimately, advances aviation safety” (Borrillo, 2003). 
In the 1970s, the Human Intervention Motivation Study (HIMS) grew out of a 
grant from the National Institute for Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.  This program 
which is a cooperative, mutually supportive program between the FAA, Pilot Union and 
airline allows pilots to seek treatment and rehabilitation that leads to medical 
certification.  An analysis of the program found that with proper treatment the airline 
pilot rehabilitation rate was successful (92-95%) and cost effective, a Return On 
Investment (ROI) of $9 for every $1 spent (Borrillo, 2003).  Per the HIMS website, 
www.himsprogram.com over 3500 pilots that have participated in the program are flying 
today after loss of their medical certificate (Martinez, 2003).   
In 2002, 879 1st class, 218 2nd class, and 318 3rd class special issuance medical 
certificates were issued to substance-dependent pilots, of which 1,415 were for 
alcoholism, and 79 for illicit drug dependence.  Over a three year period, pilots 
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participating in the HIMS program showed a 10 percent relapse rate according to the 
Aviation Medicine Advisory Service (Borillo, 2003). 
According to Dr. Quay Snyder of Virtual Flight Surgeons there are three choices 
for companies in addressing recognition, treatment and assistance for alcohol and drug 
abuse/dependence of its pilots.  First, a company can choose to do nothing, essentially 
ignoring the fact that there may potentially be an issue that arises.  In these cases, pilots 
are at the mercy of corporate policy and FAA regulations.  Secondly, an organization 
may adopt a policy of Zero Tolerance which subjects pilots to termination who are 
discovered even if they seek help.  This approach further serves to fuel the disease being 
hidden, going undiscovered and unreported.  Finally, the final strategy is one of a 
proactive approach.  This approach involves compassionate concern and constructive 
confrontation.  The proactive approach does not tolerate behaviors contrary to company 
or regulatory policies, such as consistently showing up for flights late or under the 
influence of substances.  However, behavioral aspects are treated as separate issues from 
recognition, treatment and assistance of the disease.   
Critical factors in the success of a proactive approach are: 
1) Commitment of confidentiality to the employee seeking assistance 
2)  Non-punitive approach for the employee seeking help 
3) Clearly defined, well publicized procedures for seeking help and obtaining 
treatment that include the consequences of choices given to the employee 
4) Adequate medical coverage/insurance 
5) Sick leave policy that allows use of this time for treatment 
6) Short-term/Long-term disability policy for use during recovery period 
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7) Cooperation and coordination of insurance/Employee Assistance Program 
(EAP)  
8) Treatment at a credible facility that use professionals in all phases of 
treatment and extended aftercare programs – all which must be acceptable 
to the FAA 
9) Peer/Fellow pilot monitor active in all aspects of the recovery program 
(required by the FAA) (Snyder, 2003). 
One such proactive approach program is the Human Intervention Motivation 
Study (HIMS) jointly administered by the FAA, the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) or 
the Allied Pilots Association (APA), and respective airline management.  The HIMS 
program allows an avenue for pilots seeking treatment and rehabilitation that leads to 
early FAA medical certification under special issuance.  The HIMS program includes the 
following elements: 
Written Structure 
1) A written policy including a mission statement that defines the goals of the 
program 
2) Written company policies clearly stated 
3) Clear written guidance describing procedures for each participant in the program 
to follow 
Treatment Continuum  
1) Identification of a potential problem 
2) Intervention for a specific individual 
3) Assessment of whether a problem truly exists by impartial, trained professionals 
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4) Treatment, including aftercare 
5) Continuous monitoring 
Medical Certification 
1) Careful review of all aspects of treatment continuum 
2) Review of monitoring program by company, peers, and medical professionals 
3) Certification is not permanent, but is subject to periodic review and 
documentation of continued sobriety and commitment to a 12-step program. 
Education 
1) Training for specific groups involved in the program such as – EAP staff, 
supervisory/management staff, Directors of Aviation/Operations, Chief Pilots, 
professional standards personnel, peer monitors, entire pilot group and their 
families. 
2) Promotion of the program to reinforce procedures for seeking help. 
Evaluation 
Finally, regular evaluation of the proactive approach program is necessary for consistent 
improvement (Snyder, 2003).  
Conclusions 
The HIMS program is currently being modified for individual corporate aviation 
organizations by Virtual Flight Surgeons (VFS).  Virtual Flight Surgeons is a private 
practice team of Aviation Medical Examiners (AME’s) providing FAA medical 
certification expertise.  Anecdotally, these programs and other policy formation are being 
created as result of specific alcohol/drug related incidents that have occurred with crew 
members.  Presently, the current status of alcohol and drug policies is unknown in FAR 
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Part 91 corporate/executive flight departments.  Subsequently, there is not an accurate 
gauge of the potential impact of a HIMS type program for corporate aviation 
organizations, both in terms of whole numbers of policies but in terms of numbers of 
pilots assisted.   
Further analysis of the status quo is required by studying the types of alcohol/drug 
policies are currently in place within Part 91 corporate/executive flight operations.  
Additionally, data are required to understand the prevalence of alcohol and drug related 
suspicion and incidents that flight department leaders may be facing.  Finally, it is vital to 
the success of a HIMS-type program to assess the corporate aviation leader’s familiarity 
with the program and receptiveness towards the implementation of such policies.  This 
study proposes a plan to address these questions.   
In the future, the implementation of a HIMS-type program in corporate aviation 
operations should be monitored for the degree of qualitative and quantitative success, and 
the magnitude of its impact on pilots, their organizations and families. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Study Design 
  In order to specifically address the research questions posed in this research 
proposal, the study consisted of a combination of quantitative and qualitative research in 
a casual-comparative, quasi-experimental design using quasi-replication methodology.  
This study used Cook’s 1994-1995 study that surveyed air crew alcohol and drug policies 
among international, commercial airlines as a guiding material to create this study.  In 
personal communications with Mr. Cook in May of 2007, the original survey instrument 
used in his study was no long available and determined to be unrecoverable.  Therefore, 
this study developed survey questions based loosely upon Mr. Cook’s final data, 
conclusions, and recommendations.   
  Quantitative information was gathered through a series of finite questions.  
Qualitative information was collected through a series of open-ended questions designed 
to gather a deeper understanding of answers submitted in the quantitative portion.  
Additionally, subjects were asked to submit copies copy of written company alcohol and 
drug policies for further qualitative analysis.  In using an instrument that synthesized 
quantitative and qualitative data it was hoped that the richest information could be 
obtained about the industry’s status quo of written company alcohol/drug policies.  This 
study sought to gain an understanding of the prevalence of suspicion and the rate of 
addressing substance abuse/dependence issues in flight operations.  Additionally, this 
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study wished to gain insight about leader’s familiarity with the FAA’s program to return 
pilots to duty after a substance issue and the level of receptiveness to the addition of 
policies for the rehabilitation and job recovery of pilots.  Finally, through analysis it is 
hoped that conclusions can be drawn about the relationship of those corporate/executive 
flight operations which have alcohol/drug policies and those that do not. 
Instrument 
  The survey instrument included the collection of demographic information, six 
groupings of questions and one request for submission.  The demographic data collected 
were: Number of Pilots, Number of Aircraft, and Types of Aircraft (noting multiples of 
same aircraft type). The first three groupings of questions attempted to identify the 
prevalence of three types of written (general, rehabilitation, job retention/recovery) 
alcohol/drug policies within FAR Part 91 corporate/executive operations.  These three 
groupings of questions each included: a) Dichotomous, Yes/No question regarding the 
status quo of written drug/alcohol policies, b) Likert-scale type question asking the 
decision maker to rank between 1-5 how important having the policies were, and c) Free 
form area asking the participant to discuss why these policies were or were not important.  
The fourth and fifth grouping of questions sought to identify the if participants had ever 
suspected substance issues with air crew members and whether or not they had ever had 
to address substance issues with pilots.  These questions asked the participant to answer 
one dichotomous, Yes/No question for each.  The sixth grouping of questions sought to 
identify the familiarity with the HIMS program and the receptiveness of implementing an 
alcohol/drug policy that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery into the 
participants’ flight operation.  The participant was asked the following: a) Likert-scale 
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type question asking the leader to rank between 1-5 the level of familiarity with the 
HIMS program, b) One Ranking, Yes/Maybe/No question to identify whether or not the 
participants’ company/department would consider implementation of pilot rehabilitation 
and job retention/recovery policy, c) Free form area asking the participant to discuss why 
they would or would not consider such a policy.  Finally, the last question of the survey 
asked the participant if they are willing to be contacted by the Principle Investigator who 
would arrange to obtain copies of written alcohol/drug policies for further qualitative 
analysis.  This section additionally notes protection of any information submitted and that 
it is treated a confidential.  See Appendix A for a sample of the survey created.    
Instrument Reliability and Validity 
  In order to insure validity of the survey instrument, a panel of five industry and 
educational experts were selected to review the content of the questionnaire.  The team of 
educational and industry experts were drawn from the John D. Odegard School for 
Aerospace Sciences at the University of North Dakota and Virtual Flight Surgeons.  The 
experts that provided several rigorous reviews of and final approval for the content 
validity of the instrument were: Warren Jensen, M.D.; Paul Lindseth, PhD; Thomas 
Petros, PhD; Doug Marshall, J.D.; and Quay Snyder, M.D. 
Sample 
  For the purposes of this study, the population was limited to those FAR Part 91 
Corporate/Executive Operators represented as members of the National Business 
Aviation Association (NBAA).  NBAA is the primary organization representing business 
aviation operators that include corporate/executive flight operations in addition to other 
entities such as FAR Part 135 Charter Operators and FAR Part 91 Subpart K Fractional 
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Operations.  The NBAA has the most comprehensive and mission-categorized 
membership of corporate/executive operations of any representative organization.  
According to NBAA, the organization represents approximately 60 percent of all 
corporate/executive flight departments operating today (NBAA, 2005).     
 The disparity of represented operators and aircraft is due to many corporate/executive 
flight departments operating single aircraft and opting not to join the NBAA membership.  
Although representative membership fluctuates, in whole numbers NBAA estimates that 
the organization represents approximately 4,600 FAR Part 91 corporate/executive 
operators (NBAA, 2005).   
  The NBAA 2006 Membership Directory was used to select convenience sample 
of participant invitees based upon published email addresses of corporate flight 
department leaders.  A total of 1,641 email addresses were compiled by hand from a 
hardcopy version of the membership directory to create the convenience sample. 
  Due to statistical power concerns researchers would have liked to have achieved a 
large response rate.  However, researchers are confident that the response rate achieved 
fell within the appropriate range.  Using logistic regression an appropriate sample size 
also fell within the acceptable range.  
Protection of Human Subjects 
  The research proposal was reviewed by the human subjects committee of the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of North Dakota.  The IRB granted 
Exempt/Expedited Review of the project on September 14, 2007.  The research project 
proposal to the IRB included a copy of informed consent for participants.  The first page 
of the survey instrument contained the informed consent page.  Potential participants 
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were informed of the size, scope, length, cost and benefits of the survey and were given 
the option of discontinuing the survey at any time.  Respondents were informed of the 
risk of their involvement and how to where help could be sought if they experienced 
difficulty with the subject matter.  Participants were also given information about privacy 
of the information submitted and how data would be coded.  Finally, contact information 
for the Principal Investigator, graduate committee and IRB were given.  In order to 
precede to the survey questions, participants were required to select the option I Accept. 
Alternatively, prospective participants were given the option of selecting the option I 
Decline. 
  Raw data is to be stored for a minimum of three years after data analysis is 
complete.  This meets the sufficient time frame required by federal, state, and local 
regulations, sponsor requirements, and organizational policies and procedures.  
The Principal Investigator established an account with Survey Monkey for the duration of 
the study which guaranteed privacy and security through an encryption process.  The 
Survey Monkey account could only be accessed by private account name and password.    
The raw data was downloaded to the Principal Investigator’s private computer and will 
be retained securely by the PI for the required time period. 
Data Collection 
  The survey invitation was emailed to the selected sample of 1,641 flight 
department leaders via SurveyMonkey.com.  The invitation provided a direct web link to 
the secure third-party vendor website, Survey Monkey which specializes in online survey 
administration.  Using an online survey company provided numerous advantages such as 
the speed and ease of distribution of the survey, constant monitoring of response rates, 
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automation of reminder messages and the ability to securely store raw data.   
  The email invitation gave a brief explanation of the purpose of the survey and 
contact information for the Principle Investigator.  Participants were asked in the 
invitation to complete the survey within 15 days.  Follow up reminder emails requesting 
participation occurred seven days and two days prior to the deadline date.  See Appendix 
B for a sample of the email invitation.   
    The survey was launched on October 15, 2007.  Data collection lasted for 
through the 31st of October 2007.  In the initial mailing, some email invitations were 
undeliverable; 293 email addresses were determined to be invalid or were filtered through 
a spam blocker to decline the message.  A reminder message was sent to those who had 
not yet responded to the survey on October 24th.  The reminder email was distributed to 
1,213 people of those 33 messages were undeliverable or were declined.  Finally, on 
October 31st a final reminder message was sent to 1,101 people, no messages were 
undeliverable.  By capturing the amount of returned email invitations and tracking when 
invitations were responded to, it was calculated that 1, 298 people received the 
invitation(s) in their email inbox.  Thus the sample population for this survey was 1,298 
people.  From the invitation, invitees were given the choice of opting out of the survey; 
31 people exercised this option.  Two-hundred and fifty-five (255) flight department 
leaders responded to the survey by following the web link to begin the survey.  Two of 
these people contacted the Principle Investigator to indicate that due to security features 
enabled on their computers they could not follow the web link provided in the email 
invitation.  An alternate link option was provided that allowed them to cut and paste the 
link into their web browser provided to these people to complete the survey.  Of the 255 
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people who began the survey, 6 people declined the informed consent, leaving 249 
potential participants. 
The scope of this survey was limited to FAR Part 91 Corporate Flight Operations.  
Measures were taken to limit the email invitation to those operating exclusively under 
FAR Part 91 prior to the mailing.  However, to ensure that respondents did in fact operate 
under Part 91 rules only, the first question of the survey asked participants to indicated 
what FAR regulatory Part(s) the operated under.  Of the 249 people responding to this 
question, 221 participants were determined to qualify to continue the survey.  The 
participants that did not qualify either operated under multiple regulatory rules, an 
alternate regulatory Part or did not answer, thus eliminating these people from continuing 
the survey. 
Data Analysis 
      Following the closure of the survey, raw data was exported from the online survey 
administrator, Survey Monkey.  The download function from Survey Monkey allowed 
for quantitative data to be coded in numerical form for those questions that were 
categorical.  Both quantitative and qualitative raw data was exported and downloaded 
into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  The Principal Investigator was then easily able to 
manipulate the data by sorting to extract quantitative from the qualitative data, while still 
maintaining the integrity of the entire raw data set.  Quantitative data was then cut and 
pasted into the data view of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).  In 
SPSS, the raw data for Likert scales and categorical were then coded in the variable view.   
  In an effort to gather the richest information possible about the subject area a 
synthesis of descriptive and inferential quantitative statistics were used.  Additionally, 
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qualitative data was analyzed in order to identify common themes. 
  The independent variables chosen included: 1) demographic information 
collected: number of pilots, number of aircraft and type(s) of aircraft, 2) reported 
importance rating of these written alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery) 3) participants’ reported suspicion of alcohol/drug issues in air crew 
members and reported events of actually addressing alcohol/drug issues, 4) familiarity 
with the FAA’s HIMS program, and 5) and receptiveness of instituting drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation and job recovery policies for pilots.  Dependent variables included the 
existence of written alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery).  
  Quantitative data gathered were first analyzed using descriptive statistics.  Raw 
numerical data and percentages were calculated for categorical data.  Frequency 
distributions, means, modes, medians, standard deviations, variances, skewness, standard 
errors of skewness, ranges, minimums, maximums and sums were also calculated and 
analyzed for continuous data.  Inferential statistics were used to calculate correlations and 
regression using non-parametric statistical tests.  Statistical tests of the data were 
administered through SPSS.   
  Correlations were calculated to identify relationships between the existence of 
alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) and 
demographic information of flight department size, importance rating of the respective 
policies (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery), suspicion of and actual 
addressing of alcohol/drug issues with pilots, familiarity with the HIMS program and 
receptiveness to instituting a policy inclusive of rehabilitation and job retention/recovery.   
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  The Point Biserial coefficient (rpb) statistic was used to calculate the correlation 
between the dependent variables of policy existence (general, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery) and the independent variables: number of pilots, importance rating of 
the respective policy, familiarity level with the HIMS program and receptiveness.  This 
statistical test was chosen due to the dichotomous, categorical nature of the dependent 
variable of either having a policy or not.  
  The Phi coefficient (Φ) statistic was used to calculate the correlation between the 
dependent variables of policy existence (general, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery) and the independent variables: existence of suspicion and actual 
addressing of alcohol/drug issues with pilots.  This statistic was chosen due to the 
dichotomous, categorical nature of both the dependent and independent variables. 
  Logistic regression statistical analyses were performed for each data set to assess 
the relationship between the predictors (size, importance levels, suspicion and/or 
addressing of an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program 
and receptiveness to implementing a policy that includes rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery) and the outcomes of having a (general alcohol/drug, rehabilitation 
and job retention/recovery) policy or not.  This regression test was chosen due to the 
dichotomous, categorical nature of the dependent variables of policy (general 
alcohol/drug, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) existence. 
  Qualitative data gathered through free form questions supporting quantitative data 
were evaluated for common themes, unique perspectives and divergent content.  This 
data was then evaluated within the context of quantitative answers given by respondents, 
thereby giving a robust depth to answers given in the survey.  Qualitative data gathered 
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from submissions of written alcohol/drug policies currently in place in flight operations 
were evaluated for common themes, unique content, and reported accordingly.   
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
Quantitative Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
This research study was designed to gain insight about the status quo of 
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policies for FAR Part 91 
corporate/executive flight operations.  Overall, researchers sought to determine the 
distribution of the answers to each of the questions posed in the study using descriptive 
statistics.  
The initial phase of the survey involved the collection of demographic 
information.  Survey participants were asked how many pilots were employed by their 
flight department, 216 people answered this question, and 5 people omitted the question.  
The total number of pilots employed by these companies was 1,219 with an average 
flight department size of 5.64 (or 6) pilots per flight department.  Participants were then 
asked the total number of aircraft operated by their flight departments.  214 people 
answered this question, 7 people omitted the question.  The total number of aircraft 
operated by these companies was 473 with an average of 2.21 (or 2) aircraft per flight 
operation.  In a freeform answer, participants were then asked to identify which types of 
aircraft that their flight department operated.  209 people answered the question with 12 
people opting to not list the specific aircraft equipment.  In reviewing the data 
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collected, there were seven respondents that began the survey answering the first two 
demographic questions, but no more.  These responses were removed from the dataset.   
In the General Alcohol/Drug Policy section, participants were asked if their flight 
operation had a written alcohol/drug policy in place for pilots.  Two-hundred and nine 
(209) people answered this question and 12 omitted the question. Of the respondents, 142 
(67.9%) indicated that they did have a written policy in place and 67 (32.1%) indicated 
that they did not have a written policy in place in their flight operation.  See Table 1 for 
the frequency distribution of written alcohol/drug policies.  When further asking the 
participants opinion of how important it was for Business Aviation flight operations to 
have written alcohol/drug policies in place for pilots, 209 people answered this question 
with 12 skipping the question.  The distribution of results from those answering showed 7 
(3.3%) indicated it was not important, 16 (7.7%) said it was of minor importance, 35 
(16.7%) noted they were neutral on the subject, 53 (25.4%) said it was important and 98 
(46.9%) said it was very important to have written policies.  See Table 2 for the 
frequency distribution of the importance rating for general alcohol/drug policies.  From 
this question, participants were asked to indicate why a written policy was important or 
not; 150 participants wrote freeform answers to this question, 59 people declined the 
freeform answer. 
Table 1  Frequency Distribution of Written General Alcohol/Drug Policies 
D/A Policy
67 31.6 32.1 32.1
142 67.0 67.9 100.0
209 98.6 100.0
3 1.4
212 100.0
No
Yes
Total
Valid
999 (Missing)Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Table 2  Frequency Distribution of Importance Levels of General Alcohol/Drug 
Policies 
Importance of D/A Policy
7 3.3 3.3 3.3
16 7.5 7.7 11.0
35 16.5 16.7 27.8
53 25.0 25.4 53.1
98 46.2 46.9 100.0
209 98.6 100.0
3 1.4
212 100.0
Not Important
Minorly Important
Neutral
Important
Very Important
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
 
In the rehabilitation section of the survey, participants were asked if their flight 
operation had a written alcohol/drug policy that specifically addressed the rehabilitation 
of pilots who have alcohol or drug issues.  Two-hundred and six (206) people answered 
this question with 12 skipping the question.  Participants indicated that 41 (19.9%) do 
have a written policy regarding rehabilitation and 165 (80.1%) do not.  See Table 3 for 
the frequency distribution of written rehabilitation policies.  When asked how important 
it is for Business Aviation flight operations to have written alcohol/drug policies that 
specifically address the rehabilitation of pilot who have alcohol or drug issues, 206 
participants rated their opinion, while 15 people omitted the question.  Participant ratings 
ranged from 26 (12.6%) indicating it was Not Important, to 24 (11.7%) indicating this 
being Minorly Important, to 81 (39.3%) noting a Neutral position, to 42 (20.4%) saying it 
was Important and 33 (16.0%) rating this as Very Important.  See Table 4 for the 
frequency distribution of the importance rating for rehabilitation policies.  From this 
question, participants were asked to indicate why a written rehabilitation policy was 
important or not; 126 participants wrote freeform answers to this question, 80 declined 
the freeform answer.   
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Table 3  Frequency Distribution of Written Rehabilitation Policies 
Rehab Policy
165 77.8 80.1 80.1
41 19.3 19.9 100.0
206 97.2 100.0
6 2.8
212 100.0
No
Yes
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Table 4  Frequency Distribution of Importance Levels of Rehabilitation Policies 
Importance of Rehab Policy
26 12.3 12.6 12.6
24 11.3 11.7 24.3
81 38.2 39.3 63.6
42 19.8 20.4 84.0
33 15.6 16.0 100.0
206 97.2 100.0
6 2.8
212 100.0
Not Important
Minorly Important
Neutral
Important
Very Important
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
In the job retention/recovery section, participants were first asked if their flight 
department had a written policy that specifically addressed the job retention/recovery of 
pilots who have alcohol or drug issues.  Two-hundred and two (202) participants 
answered the question and 19 omitted the question.  Of those who answered, 32 (15.8%) 
people said that their flight operation had a written policy addressing job recovery or 
retention and 170 (84.2%) indicated that they did not such a written policy.  See Table 5 
for the frequency distribution of written job retention/recovery policies.  Participants 
were then asked to rate (in their opinion) the importance of having written policies on job 
recovery/retention for pilots who have had alcohol or drug issues.  Two-hundred and two 
(202) participants rated the importance levels and 19 people omitted the question.  Rating 
ranged from 27 (13.4%) noting that this was Not Important, 20 (9.9%) said this was 
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Minorly Important, 85 (42.1%) rating themselves as having a Neutral position, 42 
(20.8%) said the issue was Important and 28 (13.9%) showed this area as being Very 
Important.  See Table 6 for the frequency distribution of the importance rating for general 
alcohol/drug policies.  From this question, participants were then asked to indicate why 
or why not in a freeform answer, of which 102 people made written commentary about 
their rating. 
Table 5  Frequency Distribution of Written Job Retention/Recovery Policies 
Job Retention/Recovery Policy
172 81.1 85.1 85.1
30 14.2 14.9 100.0
202 95.3 100.0
10 4.7
212 100.0
No
Yes
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Table 6  Frequency Distribution of Importance Levels of Job Retention/Recovery 
Policies  
Importance of Job Retention/Recovery Policy
27 12.7 13.4 13.4
20 9.4 9.9 23.3
85 40.1 42.1 65.3
42 19.8 20.8 86.1
28 13.2 13.9 100.0
202 95.3 100.0
10 4.7
212 100.0
Not Important
Minorly Important
Neutral
Important
Very Important
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
In the Alcohol/Drug Issues section participants were asked first if they had ever 
been suspicious that a pilot in their flight operation might have some kind of alcohol or 
drug issue.  Two-hundred and three (203) people answered the question of which 50 
(24.6%) indicated Yes they did have suspicions and 153 (75.4%) said No they had never 
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suspected any pilot of having an alcohol or drug issue.  Eighteen (18) people omitted the 
question.  See Table 7 for the frequency distribution of suspecting an alcohol/drug issue 
with pilots.  In the second portion of this section, participants were asked if they had ever 
had to address an alcohol or drug issue with a pilot in their flight operation.  203 people 
answered this question, of which 47 (23.2%) said Yes they have had to address an 
alcohol or drug issue with a pilot in their flight operation and 156 (76.8%) said they had 
never had to address this issue.  Eighteen (18) people omitted the question.  See Table 8 
for the frequency distribution of actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with pilots. 
Table 7  Frequency Distribution of Suspicion of Alcohol/Drug Issues 
Suspect D/A Problem
153 72.2 75.4 75.4
50 23.6 24.6 100.0
203 95.8 100.0
9 4.2
212 100.0
No
Yes
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
 
Table 8  Frequency Distribution of Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues 
Actual Addressing D/A Problem
156 73.6 76.8 76.8
47 22.2 23.2 100.0
203 95.8 100.0
9 4.2
212 100.0
No
Yes
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
In the Incorporation of Written Alcohol/Drug Policies section, participants where 
asked to rate their familiarity with the voluntary FAA program, the Human Intervention 
Motivation Study (HIMS) to return pilots diagnosed with alcohol and drug issues to 
flying with the cooperation of the employer.  Two-hundred and two (202) people rated 
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their familiarity with the HIMS program and 19 omitted the question.  The distribution of 
familiarity ratings ranged from those who were Unfamiliar (Never heard of the HIMS 
program), 132 (65.3%); to those who were Somewhat Familiar (Heard of the HIMS 
program, but did not know where to obtain details), 57 (28.3%); to those Familiar (Have 
obtained HIMS program details and know where to obtain additional information), 10 
(5.0%); to those Very Familiar (Have used the HIMS program as guidance in developing 
their own departmental alcohol & drug policy), 2 (1.0%); and those who were Extremely 
Familiar (Implemented a HIMS program in their flight department), 1 (0.5%).  See Table 
9 for the frequency distribution of familiarity level with the HIMS program.  In the 
second half of this section, participants where asked if their flight department would 
consider a written alcohol/drug policy for the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery of 
pilots if a proven, successful template was provided.  Two-hundred and two (202) people 
answered the question of which 51 (25.2%) indicated that Yes they would, 97 (48.0%) 
indicated Maybe and 54 (26.7%) said No.  Nineteen (19) people omitted the question.  
See Table 10 for the frequency distribution of receptiveness to implementation of a 
rehabilitation and job retention/recovery policy.  Upon completion of this question, 
participants were asked to give a freeform notation of why or why not, 92 people 
responded. 
Descriptive statistics were calculated to further describe continuous data.  See 
Table 11 for the illustration of the descriptive statistics of the data collected.   
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Table 9  Frequency Distribution of Levels of Familiarity with the HIMS Program 
How Familiar w/ HIMS
132 62.3 65.3 65.3
57 26.9 28.2 93.6
10 4.7 5.0 98.5
2 .9 1.0 99.5
1 .5 .5 100.0
202 95.3 100.0
10 4.7
212 100.0
Unfamiliar
Somewhat Familiar
Familiar
Very Familiar
Extremely Familiar
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Table 10  Frequency Distribution of Receptiveness of Implementing an Alcohol/Drug 
Policy that Includes Rehabiliation and Job Retention/Recovery 
How Receptive to Policy
54 25.5 26.7 26.7
97 45.8 48.0 74.8
51 24.1 25.2 100.0
202 95.3 100.0
10 4.7
212 100.0
No
Maybe
Yes
Total
Valid
999Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Table 11  Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Data 
Statistics
212 210 209 206 202 202 202
0 2 3 6 10 10 10
5.63 2.19 4.05 3.16 3.12 1.43 .99
.379 .116 .077 .084 .083 .048 .051
3.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00
2 1 5 3 3 1 1
5.519 1.678 1.117 1.204 1.178 .682 .723
30.461 2.815 1.248 1.449 1.389 .465 .522
2.191 1.905 -1.014 -.184 -.214 1.868 .022
.167 .168 .168 .169 .171 .171 .171
5.185 4.402 .161 -.634 -.517 4.545 -1.072
.333 .334 .335 .337 .341 .341 .341
32 10 4 4 4 4 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
33 11 5 5 5 5 2
1194 460 846 650 630 289 199
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
# Pilots # Aircraft
Importance of
D/A Policy
Importance of
Rehab Policy
Importance
of Job
Retention/
Recovery
Policy
How Familiar
w/ HIMS
How
Receptive to
Policy
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In the final section, Optional Written Policy Submission, participants were asked 
if they were willing to be confidentially contacted by the Principal Investigator to arrange 
a convenient way to submit a copy of their written flight operations alcohol/drug policy.  
One-hundred and ninety-seven (197) people answered the question and 24 people omitted 
the question.  One-hundred and sixty (160) (81.2%) people declined to be contacted and 
37 (18.8%) people indicated their willingness to be contacted by the PI and to submit a 
copy of their policies regarding alcohol and drugs.  For those participants agreeing to be 
contacted, the survey routed them to a page where they could fill in contact information 
for a follow up to the survey.   
Inferential Statistics 
In structuring the survey instrument, demographic information about the size of 
corporate flight operations was collected.  However, the Principal Investigator had to 
assess which variables accurately defined flight department size in terms of this research 
study.  Was size the number of pilots, the number of aircraft, aircraft types or a complex 
combination?  In the free form area in which participants could report their aircraft 
type(s) and number of each aircraft, there was a wide variability in how each person 
reported or coded the types of aircraft in their flight operation.  Additionally, there 
currently is no universally accepted practice of coding to identify the size of an aircraft 
by its type certification.  This variability in interpretation became increasingly 
complicated when there were different aircraft types within a flight operation, which was 
very commonly reported.  Because of this reason, aircraft types were determined to be a 
less optimal choice in identifying flight department size.     
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 Upon reviewing the raw demographic data of number of pilots and number of 
aircraft, there was an assumption that there would be a fairly high correlation between 
these two factors, i.e., it takes more pilots to fly more airplanes.  While this assumption is 
not entirely linear, it proved to be fairly accurate with Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation value of r(210) = 0.854, p = 0.05.  Ultimately it was determined that for this 
particular study size would be determined by the number of pilots rather than the number 
of aircraft.  Valid arguments can be made that leaders regard size as also being a function 
of the number of aircraft, size of equipment, or even mission of the operation. However, 
this decision to use the number of pilots in the flight operation as a measure of size was 
made because this research is centered on the challenges of human factor, rather than of 
the aircraft.    
Hypothesized Findings 
It was hypothesized that an increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots), 
importance level of written general alcohol/drug policies, suspicion of and/or actually 
addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program 
and receptiveness to implementing a policy that included rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery would effect the odds of having a written alcohol/drug policy in place.  
Appropriate statistical tests were calculated to test this hypothesis.  
The Point-Biserial (rpb) and Phi (Φ) correlations (two-tailed design) for general 
alcohol/drug policy and the independent variables were calculated and are reported as 
follows: 
• Number of Pilots, rpb(209) = 0.343*, p = 0.05 
• Importance of a Written Alcohol/Drug Policy, rpb(207) = 0.699*, p = 0.05 
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• Suspicion of an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(200) = 0.173*, p = 0.01 
• Actually Addressing an Alcohol/Drug, Φ(200) = 0.102, p = 0.05 
• Familiarity Level with the HIMS Program, rpb(200) = 0.082, p = 0.05 
• Receptiveness to Rehabilitation and Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(200) = 
0.010, p = 0.05  
These calculations revealed significance at the α = 0.05 level for the three 
independent variables of number of pilots, importance of having a written alcohol/drug 
policy and suspicion of an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot.  However, for the variables of 
actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS 
program and receptivity to implementing a rehabilitation and job retention/recovery 
policy there was not a significant correlation, therefore we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect in these cases. 
A logistic regression was performed for these variables.  The results showed that 
only the number of pilots, p = 0.004 and the level of importance of having this respective 
policy, p = 0.000 were of significance.  For these variables we reject the null hypothesis 
that no effect occurred.  Having suspicion of an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot did not 
produce a level significance in the regression analysis, thus we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect with this variable.   
Effect size was also calculated for those variables significantly contributing to 
having a written general alcohol/drug policy in place.  For every pilot added to the flight 
operation the odds of having a written alcohol/drug policy in place increases by 1.4 times. 
This finding shows significant contribution of size to whether or not a flight operation has 
a written alcohol/drug policy in place.  Additionally, for those leaders that increase the 
 
 
46
  
level of importance (of having a written general alcohol/drug policy) by one unit, the 
odds of having a written policy in place increase over six fold.  This finding shows a 
powerful contribution of the effect of importance to whether or not a flight operation has 
a policy in place or not.  See Table 12 for the classification table and Table 13 for a 
synthesis of the regression analysis of general alcohol/drug policies. 
Table 12  Classification for the Prevalence of General Alcohol/Drug Policies 
Classification Tablea
46 17 73.0
9 127 93.4
86.9
Observed
No
Yes
D/A Policy
Overall Percentage
Step 1
No Yes
D/A Policy Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
Table 13  Regression Analysis for General Alcohol/Drug Policies 
Variables in the Equation
.306 .106 8.386 1 .004 1.358
1.856 .284 42.823 1 .000 6.401
-.351 .972 .131 1 .718 .704
.230 .968 .056 1 .812 1.258
-.135 .329 .169 1 .681 .874
-.274 .334 .672 1 .412 .760
-7.034 1.392 25.525 1 .000 .001
Pilots
ImpDAPolicy
SuspectProb(1)
AddressProb(1)
FamHIMS
RecToPolicy
Constant
Step
1
a
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pilots, ImpDAPolicy, SuspectProb, AddressProb, FamHIMS,
RecToPolicy.
a. 
        
It was hypothesized that an increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots), 
importance level of written rehabilitation policies, suspicion of and/or actually addressing 
an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program and 
receptiveness to implementing a policy that included rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery would effect the odds of having a rehabilitation policy in place.  
Appropriate statistical tests were calculated to test this hypothesis.  
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The Point-Biserial (rpb) and Phi (Φ) correlations between written rehabilitation 
policy and the independent variables were calculated and are reported as follows: 
• Size (Number of Pilots), rpb(206) = 0.224*, p = 0.05 
• Importance of Having a Written Rehabilitation Policy, rpb(204) = 0.542*, p = 0.05 
• Suspicion of an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.224*, p = 0.05 
• Actually Addressing an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.188*, p = 0.05 
• Familiarity Level with the HIMS Program, rpb(201) = 0.131, p = 0.05 
• Receptiveness to Rehabilitation and Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(201) =  
-0.008, p = 0.05 
These calculations revealed significance at the α = 0.05 level for the four 
independent variables of number of pilots, importance of having a rehabilitation policy, 
suspicion of and actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot.  However, for the 
variables of familiarity level with the HIMS program and receptivity to implementing a 
rehabilitation and job recovery/retention policy there was not a significant correlation, 
therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect in these cases. 
A logistic regression was performed for these variables.  The results showed that 
only the level of importance of having this respective policy, p = 0.000 was of 
significance.  For this variable we reject the null hypothesis of no effect.  The number of 
pilots, suspicion of and actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot did not 
produce a level significance in the regression analysis, thus we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect with these variables.   
Effect size was also calculated for the importance rating of having a rehabilitation 
policy significantly contributing to having a written rehabilitation policy in place.  For 
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those leaders that increase the level of importance (of having a written rehabilitation 
policy) by one unit, the odds of having a written policy in place increases nearly seven 
fold.  This finding shows a powerful contribution of the effect of importance to whether 
or not a flight operation has this type of policy in place or not.  See Table 14 for the 
classification table and Table 15 for a synthesis of the regression analysis for 
rehabilitation polices. 
Table 14  Classification for the Prevalence of Rehabilitation Policies 
Classification Tablea
150 10 93.8
15 25 62.5
87.5
Observed
No
Yes
Rehab Policy
Overall Percentage
Step 1
No Yes
Rehab Policy Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
Table 15  Regression Analysis for Rehabilitation Policies 
Variables in the Equation
.035 .037 .857 1 .355 1.035
.115 .680 .029 1 .865 1.122
-.887 .695 1.629 1 .202 .412
.032 .305 .011 1 .916 1.033
-.125 .339 .135 1 .713 .883
1.903 .312 37.133 1 .000 6.707
-8.126 1.403 33.553 1 .000 .000
Pilots
SuspectProb(1)
AddressProb(1)
FamHIMS
RecToPolicy
ImpRHBPolicy
Constant
Step
1
a
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pilots, SuspectProb, AddressProb, FamHIMS, RecToPolicy,
ImpRHBPolicy.
a. 
 
It was hypothesized that an increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots), 
importance level of written job retention/recovery policies, suspicion of and/or actually 
addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program 
and receptiveness to implementing a policy that included rehabilitation and job 
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retention/recovery would effect the odds of having a written job retention/recovery policy 
in place.  Appropriate statistical tests were calculated to test this hypothesis.   
 The Point-Biserial (rpb) and Phi (Φ) correlations between written rehabilitation 
policy and the independent variables were calculated and are reported as follows: 
• Number of Pilots, rpb(202) = 0.207*, p = 0.05 
• Importance of Having a Written Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(201) = 
0.505*, p = 0.05 
• Suspicion of an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.115, p = 0.05 
• Actually Addressing an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.067, p = 0.05 
• Familiarity Level with the HIMS Program, rpb(201) = 0.082, p = 0.05 
• Receptiveness to Rehabilitation and Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(201) =  
-0.021, p = 0.05 
These calculations revealed significance at the α = 0.05 level for the two 
independent variables of number of pilots and importance of having a job 
retention/recovery policy.  However, for the variables of suspicion of and actually 
addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program 
and receptivity to implementing a rehabilitation and job recovery/retention policy there 
was not a significant correlation, therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis in these 
cases. 
A logistic regression was performed for these significant variables.  The results 
showed that only the level of importance of having this respective policy, p = 0.000 was 
of significance.  For this variable we reject the null hypothesis.  The number of pilots did 
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not produce a level significance in the regression analysis, thus we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis with this variables.   
Effect size was also calculated for the importance rating of having a job 
retention/recovery policy significantly contributing to having a written job 
retention/recovery policy in place.  For those leaders that increase the level of importance 
(of having a written rehabilitation policy) by one unit, the odds of having a written policy 
in place increases nine fold.  This finding shows a powerful contribution of the effect of 
importance to whether or not a flight operation has this type of policy in place or not.  
See Table 16 for the classification table and Table 17 for a synthesis of the regression 
analysis for job retention/recovery policies. 
Table 16  Classification for the Prevalence of Job Retention/Recovery Policies 
Classification Tablea
162 8 95.3
12 18 60.0
90.0
Observed
No
Yes
Job Retention/Recovery
Policy
Overall Percentage
Step 1
No Yes
Job
Retention/Recovery
Policy Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
 
 
Table 17 Regression Analysis for Job Retention/Recovery Policies 
Variables in the Equation
.062 .039 2.457 1 .117 1.063
-.135 .779 .030 1 .863 .874
-.181 .795 .052 1 .820 .834
.005 .377 .000 1 .989 1.005
-.737 .407 3.284 1 .070 .478
2.215 .384 33.300 1 .000 9.160
-9.591 1.680 32.592 1 .000 .000
Pilots
SuspectProb(1)
AddressProb(1)
FamHIMS
RecToPolicy
ImpJobRetPolicy
Constant
Step
1
a
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pilots, SuspectProb, AddressProb, FamHIMS, RecToPolicy,
ImpJobRetPolicy.
a. 
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Non-hypothesized Findings 
In running the statistical correlations for hypothesized data, the PI entered all 
variables.  The following data derived from these test represents significant, but non-
hypothesized findings.  This information could formulate the basis for future research. 
The number of pilots in the flight operation was found to be statistically 
significant when correlated with the following:  
• Importance of having a written alcohol/drug policy, r(209) = 0.317, p = 0.05  
• Importance of having a written rehabilitation policy, r(206) = 0.209, p = 0.05 
• Importance level of written job retention/recovery policy, r(202) =  0.172, p = 
0.01   
• Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(203) = 0.227, p 
= 0.05 
• Having to address an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation, rpb 
(203) = 0.244, p = 0.05 
• Familiarity level with the HIMS program, r(202) = 0.229, p = 0.05 
Having a written alcohol/drug policy in place was found to be statistically 
significant when correlated with the following: 
• Having a written rehabilitation policy, Φ(203) = 0.311, p = 0.05 
• Importance level of having a written rehabilitation policy, rpb(203) = 0.250, p 
= 0.05 
• Having a written job retention/recovery policy, Φ(199) = 0.257, p = 0.05 
• Importance level of written job retention/recovery policy, rpb(199) = 0.222, p 
= 0.05 
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The importance level of having a written alcohol/drug policy in place was found 
to be statistically significant when correlated with the following: 
• Having a written rehabilitation policy, rpb(204) = 0.286, p = 0.05 
• Importance level of having a written rehabilitation policy, r(204) = 0.403, p = 
0.05 
• Having a written job retention/recovery policy, rpb(200) = 0.191, p = 0.05 
• Importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy, r(200) = 
0.367, p = 0.05 
• Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(201) = 0.210, p 
= 0.05 
• Having addressed an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation,  
rpb(201) = 0.143, p = 0.01 
Having a written rehabilitation policy in place at the flight operation was found to 
be statistically significant when correlated with the following:  
• Having a written job retention/recovery policy, Φ(202) = 0.655, p = 0.05 
• Importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy, rpb(201) = 
0.444, p = 0.05  
The importance level of having a written rehabilitation policy in place was found 
to be statistically significant when correlated with the following:  
• Having a written job retention/recovery policy in place,  rpb(201) = 0.443, p = 
0.05 
• Importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy, r(201) = 
0.842, p = 0.05  
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• Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(202) = 0.219, p 
= 0.05 
• Familiarity level with HIMS program, r(201) = 0.200, p = 0.05 
The importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy was found 
to be statistically significant when correlated with:  
• Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(202) = 0.186, p 
= 0.05 
• Familiarity with the HIMS program, r(201) = 0.197, p = 0.05 
Having suspected a pilot in the operation of having an alcohol/drug issue was 
found to be statistically significant when correlated with:  
• Having to address an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation, 
Φ(203) = 0.716, p = 0.05 
• Familiarity with the HIMS program, rpb(202) = 0.193, p = 0.05 
Having to address an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation was 
found to be statistically significant when correlated with the Familiarity level of the 
HIMS program, rpb(202) = 0.168, p = 0.01. 
One statistical correlation observed was particularly large.  The correlation for the 
suspicion of and actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot was shown to be 
Φ(203) = 0.716, p = 0.05.  The Principal Investigator was interested to understand the 
relationship of these two variables.  The Pearson’s chi-square test was performed for 
suspicion and addressing alcohol/drug issues.  The results revealed a value of χ2(1, N = 
203) = 104.133, p = 0.05.  The value of χ2 is exceeds the critical value of 3.84 for 1 df at 
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the α = 0.05 level, thus it has been concluded that these variables are not independent of 
one another.  The results are shown in Tables 18-21 as follows: 
Table 18 Crosstabulation for Suspicion *Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues 
Suspect D/A Problem * Actual Addressing D/A Problem Crosstabulation
144 9 153
94.1% 5.9% 100.0%
92.3% 19.1% 75.4%
70.9% 4.4% 75.4%
12 38 50
24.0% 76.0% 100.0%
7.7% 80.9% 24.6%
5.9% 18.7% 24.6%
156 47 203
76.8% 23.2% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
76.8% 23.2% 100.0%
Count
% within Suspect D/A
Problem
% within Actual
Addressing D/A Problem
% of Total
Count
% within Suspect D/A
Problem
% within Actual
Addressing D/A Problem
% of Total
Count
% within Suspect D/A
Problem
% within Actual
Addressing D/A Problem
% of Total
No
Yes
Suspect D/A
Problem
Total
No Yes
Actual Addressing D/A
Problem
Total
 
  
 
Table 19 Chi-Square Tests for Suspicion * Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues  
Chi-Square Tests
104.133b 1 .000
100.230 1 .000
96.127 1 .000
.000 .000
103.620 1 .000
203
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.
58.
b. 
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Table 20 Measures of Association for Suspicion * Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues  
Symmetric Measures
.716 .000
.716 .000
.716 .058 14.550 .000c
.716 .058 14.550 .000c
203
Phi
Cramer's V
Nominal by
Nominal
Pearson's RInterval by Interval
Spearman CorrelationOrdinal by Ordinal
N of Valid Cases
Value
Asymp.
Std. Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a. 
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.b. 
Based on normal approximation.c. 
 
 
Table 21 Risk Estimates for Suspicion * Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues 
Risk Estimate
50.667 19.886 129.093
3.922 2.391 6.432
.077 .040 .149
203
Odds Ratio for Suspect
D/A Problem (No / Yes)
For cohort Actual
Addressing D/A
Problem = No
For cohort Actual
Addressing D/A
Problem = Yes
N of Valid Cases
Value Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval
 
 
Qualitative Findings 
Free Form Discussion 
The study expected to find a high prevalence of common attitudes regarding the 
existence and importance of alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery) policies.  These attitudes included two main areas: Zero Tolerance 
and the Moral Model of Addiction.   
 In the qualitative portion of the survey, respondents were given the opportunity to 
expound upon their quantitative answers.  Four sections of the survey asked the 
participants to answer in a free form format the question: Why or Why Not?   
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In the first three sections, the why or why not question followed a finite question 
that asked the flight department leader to rate the level of importance of having a certain 
type of policy in place.  First, the participants were asked to rate how important it is for 
corporate flight operations to have a written Alcohol and Drug policy, and then they were 
asked to respond to the question: Why or Why Not?  Eighty (80) people gave free form 
responses to this first question.  A great majority of people felt that having a written 
alcohol and drug policy in place was either important or very important in order to 
establish clear cut guidelines, crewmember expectations, define the consequences of 
certain behavior to eliminate subjectivity, misunderstanding and reduce risk.  Among 
those that felt it was important or very important to have a written policy there was 
variability in the content of those policies including some who cited having flexible 
guidelines on consumption, zero tolerance, a reiteration of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs) and reliance upon the organization’s corporate policy.  Many felt 
that this type of policy was important for creating a culture of safe operations (for 
employees and passengers), protection against litigation, fairness to employees and a 
protocol for encountering difficult situations.  FARs were cited by a few participants as 
containing the minimum standard of operation and that flight operations had to establish 
a higher standard in a written form.  A few people felt that written alcohol and drug 
policies served as deterrents to bad behavior.  Several respondents felt that alcohol and 
drug policies were critical for larger corporate flight operations but were unnecessary for 
small flight operations.   
Alternatively, the minority of respondents felt that written policies were either 
unimportant, minorly important or were positioned neutrally on the subject.  Counter to 
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the majority, many respondents felt that the FARs had established the guideline on the 
issue of alcohol and drugs, so no additional written policy was required.  However, like 
those that felt that written policies were important they too felt as though size of the flight 
operation was a factor in determining whether or not an alcohol and drug policy was 
warranted.  Many leaders went on to indicate that their particular operation was in fact 
small enough that should an issue occur, they would be aware immediately, as they also 
act as full-time flight crew members.  Some participants specified that a written policy 
was not needed in the flight operation as they had never encountered any issue with 
alcohol or drugs.  A handful of these people went on to say that issues with alcohol and 
drugs very rarely exist in the business aviation sector and that this community should not 
have to write policies for the lowest common denominator.  Participants also noted their 
hiring practices, screening processes and sound judgment in place allowed them to only 
hire people who did not have any issues with alcohol or drugs, therefore eliminating the 
need for a written policy.  Some participants indicated they did not have written policies 
in place regarding alcohol and drugs because it would impose more regulation, additional 
paperwork and further legal constraints.  Finally, some leaders indicated that their 
operation did not have a written flight operations policy for alcohol and drugs because the 
format was either, verbal, memo style, or deference to their organization’s corporate 
policy which in many cases exceeded that of the FARs.  
 Next, participants were asked to rate how important it is for corporate flight 
operations to have a written alcohol/drug policy that addressed rehabilitation for those 
flight crew members who had identified as having an issue, and then they were asked to 
respond to the question: Why or Why Not?  Seventy-nine (79) people gave free form 
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responses to this qualitative question.  Overwhelmingly the respondents to this question, 
regardless of how they rated the importance of having a written rehabilitation policy, 
gave answers that indicated significant influence from the parent corporation.  Some had 
a written departmental policy that reiterated the parent corporation’s policy while others 
relied solely upon the corporate policy.  Still others indicated that if a policy were to be 
put in place, that policy must be reflective of the corporation’s philosophy about 
rehabilitation of its employees.  These people expressed concern regarding discrimination 
and equity of treatment for all employees of the organization, regardless of job duty.  For 
those who discussed the corporation’s policy, there was variability in importance ratings 
and indication of “having” a written policy in place.  A few respondents even noted they 
were unsure if the question referred to departmental or corporate policy.  However, there 
is an indication from this qualitative information that even those who have a zero 
tolerance policy or general operating philosophy are influenced heavily by the parent 
organization.  In several cases, respondents indicated that having a written policy is not 
only dependent upon the organization but by the perception of safety from the 
passengers.  In most cases the passengers of corporate flight operations are executive 
officers of the organization or key stakeholders in the company - the very people who set 
the tone for the entire business. 
For those who indicated that a written rehabilitation policy was in place and the 
rating was important or very important, these people cited that having a rehabilitation 
policy would produce a better outcome for both the individual and organization.  Many 
felt that such a policy clarified the position of the organization or department, whether it 
was a policy of zero tolerance, comprehensive rehabilitation or rehabilitation under 
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specific circumstances or conditions.   For some, a policy allows people to more easily 
come forward with an issue knowing that they would be helped and that this ultimately 
reduced risk and improved safety in the flight operation.  A few leaders indicated that any 
addiction should be treated as a medical issue, congruent with the disease model of 
addiction.  
Again, the size of the flight operation seemed to be an important factor for these 
leaders.  Regardless of how leaders rated the importance of having a written rehabilitation 
policy, many felt that having a written rehabilitation policy was a function of size.  In 
general, people felt that small organizations did not need to have a written rehabilitation 
policy, but larger flight operations did need such a policy.   
For those who rated having a written rehabilitation policy as being minorly 
important or unimportant, some felt that decision making flexibility and capability 
resided in intentionally operating without having a rehabilitation policy, so as to allow 
each case to be treated individually.  But other respondents indicated that they did not 
have a policy because it was not the organization’s responsibility to provide this type of 
assistance.  Most expanded their statements to note that the organization could not afford 
the cost of rehabilitation, noting the liability, financial exposure and numerous costs of 
doing so.  These costs, particularly for the smaller organization come from direct from 
the rehabilitation itself and absence of the crewmember, but also in terms of indirect costs 
such as employee morale and passenger’s perception of safety.  
Comments of a few leaders reflected a sentiment about crewmembers that 
experience problems with alcohol and drugs compromise safety and therefore are 
undeserving of rehabilitation.  Rehabilitation for crewmembers is no panacea for the 
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flight department; leaders cited poor success rates for rehabilitation, failure to address 
underlying behavioral issues and the potential for these crewmembers to attend rehab 
only for the purpose of getting their jobs back, not to really change.  However, a few 
participants were open to the idea of helping employees to receive rehabilitation but they 
also said the careers of these people would be impacted by such a decision.  Some felt 
that the obligation of the organization ended at rehabilitation, others felt that under 
certain perimeters a person could return to a non-flying duty.  Finally, a couple of 
participants indicated that a rehabilitation policy was unnecessary because business 
aviation very rarely has a crewmember with an alcohol or drugs issue. 
In the third series of questions, participants were asked to rate how important it is 
for corporate flight operations to have a written alcohol/drug policy that addressed job  
retention/recovery for those flight crew members who had identified as having an issue, 
and then they were asked to respond to the question: Why or Why Not?  Seventy (70) 
people gave free form responses to this qualitative question.  The vast majority of 
respondents reiterated their comments about rehabilitation, indicating that most leaders 
did not distinguish a significant difference between rehabilitation and job recovery.  The 
commentary followed similar content, with parent corporate policy being cited as the 
topic most often discussed.  Again, regardless of how the participant had rated the 
importance of having a written policy, the corporate policy was important.  Secondarily, 
many people cited a zero tolerance policy which included termination of an employee 
that presented with an alcohol or drug issue, independent of importance rating that 
spanned the range of the scale.   
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For those who indicated having a written job retention/recovery policy in place 
was important, commentary suggested that many felt that a policy clarified the position of 
the organization, set the standards of practice and consequences of behavior.  Some also 
felt that a job retention policy reduced the fear of admitting a problem, therefore reducing 
risk to safety.  Others noted that having a job retention policy was the right thing to do 
and that alcoholism was a disease, like other medical concerns.  However, while some 
may have rated the importance of such a policy as high there was still an opinion that for 
small operations this type of policy was not needed or not practical, but critical for larger 
flight operations.   
For those who noted a neutrally rated importance of have a written job 
retention/recovery policy, several indicated that having such a policy would have to be 
dictated by the corporation and/or their passengers.  Some indicated that job 
retention/recovery must be accompanied with limitations and stipulations.  Limitations 
and stipulations included specific amounts of sobriety time or proof of success, only one 
return to work opportunity, latitude to reapply for job when a medical certificate was 
obtained and return to a non-flying duty. 
Many participants that indicated a written job retention/recovery policy was 
minorly important or unimportant felt having such a policy would limit the decision 
making in their operation and would infringe upon the leader’s ability to treat each case 
individually.  Some noted that hiring practices superseded the need to have a job 
retention/recovery policy because this practice eliminated the chance of even hiring a 
person with alcohol/drug issues.  Finally, a few people noted that especially in small 
operations with limited resources the cost was too high to “hold a spot” for the recovering 
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pilot when there were so many well-qualified pilots available without alcohol or drug 
issues. 
Participants were asked whether their flight operation would consider instituting a 
written alcohol/drug policy for the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery of pilots if a 
proven, successful template was provided.  This yes/no/maybe question was then 
followed with an opportunity to answer the free form question: Why or Why Not?  
Ninety-four (94) survey participants discussed their position on this subject.  For those 
that answered with yes or maybe indicated that they would consider such a policy with 
reasons similar to previous written statements.  Corporate policy position on the subject 
of alcohol and drugs, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery heavily influenced the 
dialogue expressed.  Some felt that having a proven and successful template available 
was a good resource, but others felt that corporate policy met their present needs in this 
area.  However, participants also felt that that their corporate policy did not cover all the 
needs of airmen.  Many went on to say that any policy would have to compliment their 
organization’s current directive, must gain approval at the corporate level and would need 
to contain non-discriminatory and equitable practices.  One participant agreed that such a 
policy would codify their corporate policy.  Some participants expressed the desire for 
such a policy template in order to obtain needed guidance to initiate such protocol, 
improvement in current policies, establish good business practices that were driven by 
sound data driven academic research.  Many leaders articulated a desire to help people 
and to have a structure for keeping good employees in the flight operation if possible. 
Of course some leaders were more skeptical in their commentary, but still 
indicated they would be willing to investigate the option.  Some still thought their 
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operation was too small but that if an issue ever arose, they would want to know where to 
seek assistance.  Others questioned how having such a policy would affect the morale of 
other employees and the integrity of their operation.  Some felt that each case would need 
to be considered individually, and that since rehabilitation did not guarantee success, 
more stringent monitoring would need to be in place. 
Finally, there were those respondents who indicated they would not consider such 
a policy because the risk was simply too high.  Many noted that a policy was already in 
place, corporate or otherwise.  Zero tolerance for most flight department leaders was 
cited either in official policy form or general unwritten practice.  For some, hurdles to the 
approval of such a policy with the corporate Legal, Human Resources, Executive and 
passenger level was too great to consider.  Leaders again expressed hiring practices that 
eliminated the need for such a written policy and the desire to retain the right to treat each 
situation on a case by case basis.  Others felt it was unnecessary to consider such a policy 
because their organization did not have a problem with alcohol or drugs, it was not the 
corporation’s responsibility and rehabilitation does not work.  But again, many cited 
issues with limited resources as a function of their flight operation’s size.  One such 
participant summed this up with the simple response: Life experience. Little Resources.  
Written Policy Submissions 
 Upon reviewing the content of written policies of FAR Part 91 flight operations, 
researchers primarily expected to see policies that were a reiteration and expansion of 
FAA regulatory guidelines.  Some policies, it was expected would contain guidance on 
the use of substances and outline the consequences of this use outside of these guidelines.  
It was speculated that contained within these policies there would be references to drug 
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testing programs, particularly in conjunction with aircraft incidents and accidents.  
Finally, the PI anticipated finding larger flight operations that had more robust and 
comprehensive policies in comparison to their smaller counterparts. 
 Twenty-three (23) corporate flight operations submitted copies of alcohol and 
drug policies.  Some leaders submitted flight department policies, but four leaders 
included or only presented the organizational policy.  In reviewing the content of the 
policies, there was considerable variability in the scope of items addressed in these 
policies.  For example, two operations submitted a copy of their organizations extensive 
drug testing policy for all company employees, whereas other flight operations submitted 
policies that contained two short paragraphs addressing the use of substances by flight 
personnel.  However, regardless of content many of these policies had.       
The wording and structure of many of the policies submitted were extremely 
similar.  The most commonly occurring characteristics of these policies referenced 
compliance of FAR 91.17.  Many reiterated the language of this regulation, but expanded 
the time frame of abstinence of alcohol before performing flight duties from 8 hours to 12 
hours, while some expanded to 10 hours.  Many policies also mentioned that crew 
members should not be under the influence of alcohol or any psychoactive substance 
while performing aviation duties.  More specifically, some policies included a time frame 
(e.g., 8 hours) after being under the influence of any substance.  Some operations noted 
that airmen were to not exceed a BAC level of 0.04 by weight.  A few policies included 
the duty of pilots, to deny carriage of persons who are intoxicated or under the influence 
of drugs. 
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Various policies broadened the terms of their flight operation’s policies to include 
a limitation on the consumption of alcohol in the hours proceeding the abstinence period.  
In general, these types of policies were worded as such: Moderate consumption or no 
excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages in 6-24 hours prior to the abstinence 
period prior to duty or standby.  One notable policy directly addressed “under the 
influence” in discussing the elimination of alcohol from the body and its residual effects, 
noting that for some effects could last as long as 72 hours.  A couple of policies noted a 
specific time of day (0800-1700) that alcohol could not be consumed during standby 
duty.  Alternatively, others illustrated no consumption while on duty or standby duty.  
Still others noted a policy that specified no consumption of alcohol on non-flying days 
when away from home base, or on a Remain Overnight (RON) during normal business 
hours.   
 A few departments included policies that noted their organization indicated 
alcohol was not to be consumed on company property or while in uniform.  Some went 
further in saying that abuse of alcohol to the extent that affects good judgment or reflects 
negatively on what a professional flight crew member should be is grounds for 
termination.  A selection of flight departments had policies that required crew members 
to remove themselves from duty if they thought their performance would be affected as a 
result of alcohol use.    
Similarly, Over the Counter (OTC) and prescribed drugs were referenced in many 
policies.  In particular, several policies noted the unintended yet detrimental effect of 
OTC drugs on flight performance.  These policies left the determination of fitness for 
duty to the crew member taking the medication.  In those cases where the crew member 
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was unsure of the effects of medication on flight performance, the airman was to consult 
his/her private physician or Aviation Medical Examiner (AME).  The policies specified 
that a private physician must be informed of job duty and specifically asked how 
medications will affect flight performance.  In some cases, the policy required that all 
medications, prescription or non-prescription must be approved by an AME.  In other 
cases, the policy required that all prescription and OTC medications be reported to the 
Director of Aviation or Chief Pilot.  In singular cases, policies documented that OTC 
drugs could not be used while on duty or could be used under certain conditions.  These 
conditions included the use of non-drowsy OTC varieties provided they were not 
masking underlying problems that interfere with flight duties or use not to exceed a 
specific time (12-24 hours) prior to duty.  One policy detailed the consequence of 
habitual use of OTC medication was grounds for relief from flight duties and another 
indicated that reporting for duty under the influence of OTC drugs was grounds for 
termination.  Finally, one policy referenced the intentional misuse of prescription drugs 
was grounds for termination. 
 While the scope of this study did not include use of tobacco products, a handful of 
policies referenced the use of this substance.  Three flight operations policies stated that 
smoking was prohibited on board company aircraft and on company premises, except in 
designated areas.  Some even detailed that smoking was not allow with in a certain 
distance (e.g., 300 feet) of an airplane.  One policy mentioned that the use of tobacco 
products by crew members was highly discouraged.  Future studies could examine the 
inclusion of tobacco products in substance policies. 
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 Several flight departments submitted policies that recorded an overall 
commitment to a drug free workplace.  In these cases this message came directly from the 
organizational policy, rather than a departmental level policy.  Substantially fewer flight 
departments had policies that separately addressed illicit drugs or controlled substances.  
Some of these policies included a disclaimer reiterating that it was unlawful to use, 
manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell or possess illegal drugs.  Others stated that on 
board aircraft there was to be no carriage of narcotics, illicit drugs, marijuana, 
depressants or stimulant substances according to federal and state statues.  Most policies 
simply stated that use or possession of illegal drugs was grounds for termination.  One 
policy declared that suspicion of use in connection to flight duties would result in drug 
testing. 
 Drug testing programs and policies while they are beyond the scope of this 
particular study must be mentioned because of their interrelationship with drug and 
alcohol policies.  Two flight operations submitted testing programs as the sole policy 
upon which the department and/or company relied.  However other leaders submitted 
flight operations and company policies that referenced testing, some of which detailed 
when and under which circumstances testing would be conducted.  The most frequently 
occurring types of testing referenced were reasonable suspicion, pre-employment, post 
accident/incident and random selection for those in safety sensitive positions.  Additional 
circumstances referenced for which crew members could be tested were in accordance 
with the FAA drug testing program or at the request of the FAA Administrator, at the 
request of law enforcement, for any reason deemed necessary, substance related arrests, 
arrests for motor vehicle violations and in conjunction with scheduled FAA medical 
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exams.  Many policies indicated that positive tests would result in termination.  Finally, 
two additional terms under which crew members could be subject to testing included in 
conjunction with a documented recovery program and return to work from substance 
abuse treatment. 
 The vast majority of the policies submitted for review had no reference to 
recovery programs and return to work.  However, one company wide policy did indicate 
a voluntary disclosure program under which disciplinary action would not be taken for 
first time participants.  Non-paid leave of 14 days was granted, testing would occur after 
this time with return to work.  In this program the participant is required to submit to 3 
years of random testing, should a positive test be revealed the employee is terminated.  
One departmental policy referenced the company’s assistance program however the 
assistance program details were not given. 
 As a final component to alcohol and drug policies, a limited number of flight 
department policies required reporting procedures to the Director of Aviation or Chief 
Pilot.  These reports included warnings, alleged or actual violations of the FARs.  A 
couple of policies specified reporting to aviation leader the occurrence of any infraction 
that might jeopardize an airman’s license or medical certificate, such as a Driving Under 
the Influence (DUI) or Driving While Intoxicated (DWI).  No further mention was made 
of the procedure beyond reporting. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Review 
The purpose of this research study was to gather information regarding the current 
nature of flight departmental alcohol and drug policies within the corporate/executive 
aviation community that operate under Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs).  The design of this study was structured in order to gain insight about the 
magnitude and content of general alcohol and drug, rehabiliation and job retention and 
reovery policies, attitudes held, experience with and familiarity with particular resources 
for alcohol/drug issues and finally receptiveness to implementing policy.  Researchers 
attempted to uncover factors that may drive flight departments to write and put these 
policies in place, as they are not mandidated.   
The literature available indicates that the prevalence of alcohol and drug abuse 
and dependence among airmen is equivalent to that of the general population which is 
reported to be 5-8 percent.  The disease does not discriminate among professions, 
socioeconomic classes, gender, age, education levels or other factors (Snyder, 2003).  
The FAA acknowledges the value of education, intervention, treatment and return to 
flying duties for pilots afflicted by this common, progressive, fatal, but treatable disease.  
The FAA has accepted the definition of substance abuse/dependence provided by the 
medical community (Morse, 1992).  Aviation leaders and airmen facing alcohol and drug 
issues in the flight operation have access to resources through the Human Intervention
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Motivation Study (HIMS) program, a jointly administered program between the FAA, 
management and medical representatives for the intervention, rehabilitation and job 
retention/recovery of those airmen facing substance issues. 
The prevalence, content of alcohol/drug policies, as well as the attitudes of 
managers of international, commercial air carriers was studied in 1997 by Christopher 
Cook (Cook, 1997).  This study followed his line of research to explore the attitudes and 
policies of corporate/executive flight operations, analyzing questionnaire data and 
submitted policies.   
Our current study found that 68 percent of corporate/executive operators had 
written, general alcohol/drug policies, 20 percent had rehabilitation and 15 percent had 
job retention/recovery policies in place.  Overall, leaders of these operations reported 
general alcohol/drug policies were important or very important at a rate 72 percent.  
However, importance ratings for rehabilitation and job retention/recovery policies 
reported were normal distributed across the five point scale, with the highest 
concentrations of ratings being neutral.  Statistical tests found that the importance of the 
respective types of policies reported by leaders was a key factor in determining whether 
or not these types of policies were in place.  For of each incremental increase in the 
importance rating of the respective policy the odds of having that policy in place 
increased by six times for general alcohol/drug, seven times for rehabilitation and nine 
times for job retention/recovery.  Flight department size was speculated by researchers 
and frequently discussed by leaders as a primary factor in determining the importance of 
and the existence of these policies in the operation.  The study found the size of the flight 
department, in terms of the number of pilots was a moderate factor determining whether 
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or not the general alcohol/drug policy was in place.  Statistical tests revealed that for each 
pilot added to the flight operation the odds of having a general alcohol/drug policy in 
place increased by 1.4 times.  An important finding revealed that many leaders had direct 
experience of suspecting and addressing alcohol/drug issues with pilots.  The research 
found that 24 percent of flight department leader’s have suspected alcohol/drug issues 
with pilots and 22 percent have actually addressed these issues.  However, researchers 
found that these leaders had little familiarity with the resource available to them to deal 
with alcohol/drug issues through the HIMS program.  The study found that the bulk, 94 
percent of leaders were unfamiliar or somewhat familiar with this program.  Finally, 
leaders were asked to indicate their receptivity to implementing an alcohol/drug policy 
from a proven template that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery.  
Researchers found the data to be normally distributed across the three point scale, with 
the concentration (48 percent) reported as maybe.  The study uncovered in qualitative 
analysis of written alcohol/drug policies submitted by these flight operations that the 
majority included short narratives reiterating FAA regulatory policy, with minor hourly 
adjustments.  Survey responses in the free form discussion area primarily reflected 
support of zero tolerance policies, but that any written policies in place must be reflective 
of their parent organizations directives and philosophy surrounding the issue of 
alcohol/drugs.            
 The rationale behind researching alcohol and drug policies within 
corporate/executive flight operations was to create a factual basis for identifying the scale 
of the status quo, the potential need for these policies and baseline guidance material for 
the creation of further research in this community of aviation.  Ultimately, this data 
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supports an endeavor to promote the education of industry professionals and flight 
operations affected by substance abuse and dependence issues.  Futhermore, this research 
study supports the business aviation industry’s goal of achieving increased safety through  
industry best practices. 
Conclusions of Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 The size of the flight operation for the purposes of this research study was 
determined to be the number of pilots.  There are several statistics that are meaningful for 
the number of pilots reported.  First, the range of the number of pilots was between 1 and 
33, with a (M = 5.63, SD = 5.519) or 6 pilots per operation.  The outlier of the flight 
department reporting 33 pilots has a skewing effect on the mean.  For this reason, the 
statistics Mo = 2 and Mdn = 3 have been selected as more meaningful representations of 
the number of pilots within corporate/executive flight operations.  Interestingly, the 
number of aircraft reported while it too experienced an outlier of 11 aircraft from one 
operation the mean was not impacted as dramatically.  A range of 1-11 aircraft were 
reported a (M = 2.19, SD = 1.678) or 2 aircraft per operation.  The Mo = 1 and the Mdn = 
2 were reported for the number of aircraft per operation.  Both the number of pilots and 
number of aircraft were positively skewed, indicating that bulk of corporate/executive 
flight operations are relatively small in composition.  
 The study posed the research question: What is the prevalence of written 
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policies for pilots in 
place?  Overwhelmingly, flight departments reported that they did have general 
alcohol/drug policies in place in their operations.  In fact, 68 percent of 
corporate/executive flight operations have these types of policies.  Alternatively, the 
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balance shifts when discussing rehabilitation and job retention/recovery policies.  
Leader’s reported that 20 percent have rehabilitation policies and 15 percent have job 
retention/recovery policies in place. 
 The research study posed the research question: How important are having written 
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policies for pilots in 
place to leaders?  Figure 1 represents the distribution of percentages among flight 
operations’ reported level of importance of each of the policies. 
Figure 1 Distribution of Importance Level Percentages for Type of Alcohol/Drug 
Policies (General, Rehabilitation and Job Retention/Recovery)   
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 As the chart indicates, the distribution of importance levels for general 
alcohol/drug policies is negatively skewed.  The data reported shows that the majority of 
flight department leaders feel that these policies are either Important or Very Important; 
totaling 72 percent.  Alternatively, the distribution of data for both rehabilitation and job 
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retention/recovery programs appears to be more evenly distributed among the levels of 
importance, with a concentration in the Neutral category. 
 The study posed the research question: What is the prevalence of leaders’ 
suspicion of and/or addressing alcohol/drug issues with pilots?  The descriptive data of 
these two factors shows that one-quarter of the sample or 24 percent of leaders have 
suspected and over one-fifth of the sample or 22 percent have actually had to address an 
alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in their flight operation.  The prevalence of these findings 
was unanticipated by researchers and as a result it was determined that data should be 
examined further through statistical analysis.  The Pearson’s chi-square test was 
performed for suspicion and addressing alcohol/drug issues to uncover the nature of the 
relationship between these two variables.  The results revealed a value of χ2(1, N = 203) 
= 104.133, p = 0.05, which exceeds the critical value of 3.84 for 1 df at the p = 0.05 level, 
thus it has been concluded that these variables are not independent of one another.  
Meaningful data was obtained from the contingency tables of the chi-square test.  What 
researchers revealed was that 71 percent of leaders had no experience with suspecting 
and addressing alcohol/drug issues with pilots, whereas 19 percent did experience with 
both of these issues.  However, some leaders (6 percent) had suspected but did not 
address alcohol/drug issues and still other leaders (4 percent) had not suspected an 
alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, but did have to address this issue.     
 The study posed the research question: How familiar are leaders with the HIMS 
program?  Figure 2 shows the distribution of percentages for the familiarity levels among 
flight operations. 
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Figure 2    Distribution of HIMS Program Familiarity Level Percentages 
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 As can be seen in Figure 2, the distribution of familiarity levels is positively 
skewed.  In this case the vast majority or 94 percent of leaders were Unfamiliar and 
Somewhat Familiar with the HIMS program.  The category Unfamiliar was further 
defined in the survey as being, “never heard of the HIMS program” and Somewhat 
Familiar as being, “heard of the HIMS program, but don’t know where to obtain program 
information”.  Flight department leaders clearly need additional information about the 
details of HIMS and where to access program information, should they need to access 
this resource. 
 The study posed the research question: How receptive are leaders to 
implementing an alcohol/drug policy that includes job retention/recovery and 
rehabilitation components?  The data obtained regarding the receptiveness to this type of 
policy was normally distributed with 27 percent of flight department leader’s indicating 
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they would not, 48 percent indicating they might and 25 percent indicating they would 
consider such a policy if a proven template was provided.  
Finally, the study posed the hypothesized research question: What factors predict 
whether or not a flight operation has a written alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and 
job retention/recovery) policy for pilots in place?  Researchers hypothesized that an 
increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots), importance level of written general 
alcohol/drug policies, suspicion of and/or actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a 
pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program and receptiveness to implementing a 
policy that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery would effect the odds of 
having a written alcohol/drug policy in place.  The results of the statistical tests revealed 
that most influential factors involved in determining whether or not a flight operation 
would have a certain type of policy in place or not was the flight department leader’s 
rated importance level of the respective policy.  In fact for of each incremental increase in 
the importance rating (5 point Likert scale) of the respective policy the odds of having 
that policy in place increased by six times for general alcohol/drug, seven times for 
rehabilitation and nine times for job retention/recovery.  Flight department size was 
speculated by researchers and frequently discussed by leaders as a primary factor in 
determining the importance of and the existence of these policies in the operation.  The 
study found that only for general alcohol/drug policies was size a moderate factor 
contributing to whether or not the policy was in place.  Statistical tests revealed that for 
each pilot added to the flight operation the odds of having a general alcohol/drug policy 
in place increased by 1.4 times.  All other factors were not shown to contribute in a 
statistically significant fashion to whether a written policy of any type was in place or 
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not.  It was interesting to find these results because researchers believed that the 
implementation of written policy could be driven by having direct experience with an 
employee who had or might have an issue with alcohol/drugs.  Additionally, investigators 
thought that for those who were more familiar with the HIMS program would also be 
more likely to have a policy in place.  What was found is that because the vast majority 
of had little knowledge of the HIMS program, not enough raw numbers were seen to 
produce an effect in this area.  However, researchers reviewed the existence of policies of 
those leaders that reported a familiarity level in the median to high range of the 5 point 
scale.  It was found that 15 respondents rated their familiarity level in this (3-5) range.  
Of these 15 leaders, 4 reported having all three written policies (general alcohol/drug, 
rehabilitation and job retention/recovery), 2 reported having two of the written policies 
(general and rehabilitation), 6 reported having only written general alcohol/drug policy 
and 1 indicated that the flight operation had no written policies in place for alcohol/drugs. 
Researchers further predicted that the level of receptiveness to implementing a 
policy that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery would affect the odds of 
having a written alcohol/drug policy in place.  The statistical tests failed to uncover a 
relationship between these two variables.   
 Researchers anticipated uncovering qualitative information from respondents that 
supported Zero Tolerance policies and a reiteration of FAR regulations.  These two 
attributes were discussed most frequently by leaders in the free form section of the 
survey.  Written alcohol/drug policies submitted tangibly supported the existence of 
policies that contained a reiteration or simple expansion of the FAA guidance regarding 
alcohol and drugs.  The majority of respondents discussed the importance of having 
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written general alcohol/drug policies in place.  According to these leaders, for crew 
members policies function to establish clear guidelines; set expectations; indicate 
consequences of behavior; eliminate subjectivity, misunderstanding and reduce risk.  
However, upon review of the written policies submitted, these policies did not contain 
information that supported the reasons given by leaders for policies to be in place.  There 
appears to be a disparity between the reported goals of policy and the content of policies 
currently in place to achieve these goals.   
However, some operations do have written policies in place that discuss the 
conditions under which use of substances is approved and unapproved, including standby 
duty.  But from the wording of these policies, there is little continuity between 
organizations regarding what is defined as standby duty and duty time in this sector.  
Likely, the culture of each flight operation has a clear definition of these terms, but a 
broad industry analysis is challenging when basic terms do not have a singular meaning 
and those terms are not explicitly defined or contained in the policy.  More information is 
required regarding cultural definitions of the terms duty, standby duty and the context of 
each flight departments’ operations.   
It has been established throughout the qualitative findings that there is great 
variability in the content of policies regarding substance use, misuse, abuse and 
dependence policies and testing procedures.  More importantly we have gained insight 
that there is also a great disparity in the understanding of what each of these components 
(use, misuse, abuse, dependence and testing) mean.  Terms are used interchangeably 
adding to the confusion for leaders.   
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A selection of flight departments had policies that required crew members to 
remove themselves from duty if they thought their performance would be affected as a 
result of alcohol use.  It is interesting to note that these particular policies did not indicate 
any consequences, positive or negative of self-removal from flight duty. 
Qualitative discussion information gathered throughout the survey from leader’s 
suggested that having written policies in place was a function of the size of the flight 
operation.  The statistical analyses performed support this perspective for general 
alcohol/drug policies.  For each pilot added to the operation, the odds of having a written 
general alcohol/drug policy in place increases six times.  However, the study failed to 
measure of significant effect of the size of the operation to written policies for 
rehabilitation and job retention/recovery of pilots.  In fact, both the prevalence of these 
types of policies, discussion, and analysis of written documents suggest that these two 
sectors of policy are deferred to the parent corporation.  Deferring policy guidance to the 
parent corporation was an important topic discussed by leaders in the discussion section.  
Frequently, flight department managers stated that should written alcohol/drug policies 
be amended or instituted that they must be reflective of the corporation’s current 
directives, operating philosophy in this area for the equity of employee treatment.  In this 
way, statements are reflective of functional corporate officers. 
Limitations of Study 
This study was limited by accessibility to the entire population of FAR Part 91 
corporate/executive flight operations.  The most representative subpopulation of these 
operators was identified as being members of NBAA.  This organization represents 
approximately 60 percent of this population.  The study was further limited by available 
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email addresses for flight department leaders located in the 2006 NBAA Membership 
Directory.  As a result, the results and finding of this study may not be attributable to the 
entire population of FAR Part 91 corporate/executive flight operations. 
Survey questions were carefully structured and were analyzed for content validity 
by experts.  The survey instrument included three dichotomous yes/no questions 
regarding the existence of written (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) 
alcohol/drug policies.  These questions were structured in such a way as to give the 
survey participant the flexibility to answer affirmatively that the flight department had 
some form written alcohol and drug policy, when a policy existed at corporate level.  In 
the free form area, participants indicated that this flexibility gave way to an unanticipated 
variability in interpretation.  For some respondents, the understanding of these questions 
was that the flight department must have its own separate, written policies apart from the 
organization. Thus, some participants answered yes and some answered no to having 
such policies when the parent company had a policy that covered employees in the flight 
operation.  This also created a trickle down effect in the variability of importance ratings 
(of having such a policy).  Some indicated that having a policy was unimportant because 
the parent already covered them, whereas others indicated it was very important because 
corporate policy dictated it.   
Recommendations 
This research was a quasi-replicative study based upon the 1997 work of 
Christopher Cook.  In his findings, Cook concluded that many of the questions regarding 
preventative policies were unclear and misunderstood because participants failed to 
understand the differences between proactive and reactive alcohol and drug policies.  
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While this study took great measures to use his results in structuring the survey 
instrument, researchers still have much room for improvement to clarify the intent of 
questions.  Additional research should take into consideration distinguishing between 
corporate policy and departmental policy in the survey instrument.  The survey used 
could be clarified by expanding the answer options to include the corporate policy, 
departmental policy, and both.  Future studies could request that both the flight 
operations and corporate policies be submitted for a qualitative analysis. 
There was speculation by researchers that a relatively high correlation would be 
seen between participants that had suspected a pilot of having an alcohol or drug issue 
and actually addressing that issue.  As predicted there was a high correlation, but not 100 
percent.  There were those leaders who did suspect but then did not address the substance 
issue for some reason.  Additional research could extend this line of questioning to 
identify qualitatively the reasons behind why a leader did not intervene, when they had 
suspicion.  Perhaps there is a relationship to these reasons and the existence of guidance, 
policy and philosophy.  There were those leaders too that did not suspect but did have to 
address an alcohol or drug issue.  Additional research could also extend the line of 
questioning to identify qualitatively the context in which a leader might have to address 
an alcohol or drug issue with a crew member without warning.  Research could 
potentially uncover how leaders handled these situations, with what type of assistance, 
what the outcomes were and what might be done differently in the future to mitigate the 
exposure to risk. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had ever had suspicion 
that a pilot in their operation had an issue with alcohol or drugs this was asked as a 
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simple yes or no question.  The sensitivity of this question did not account for those flight 
department leaders that potentially may have encountered more than one pilot with an 
issue with alcohol or drugs.  When answering yes to this question leaders could have had 
multiple pilots that they suspected of having an alcohol or drug issue.  This question did 
not account for rate of suspicion.  The structure of question insensitivity also extends to 
the question asked of participants who answered yes to the question regarding having 
actually addressed an alcohol or drug issue with pilots in their flight operation.  It is 
recommended that future research take into account that flight department leaders may 
have encountered more than one crew member with a substance issue.  Future surveys 
should ask leaders to identify how many different people they have suspected and also 
how many different people they have addressed.  Collecting the rate with which leaders 
have experienced these issues is very important.  
Two participants referenced having had experience extending help to a pilot that 
had an alcohol or drug issue.  These two leaders indicated that the help that was extended 
was a failure and that this experience had influenced their opinions and policy guidance 
about alcohol and drugs.  But what constitutes failure?  If the policy was designed to give 
a person an opportunity to take advantage of rehabilitation and job retention/recovery, 
maintain safety by reducing risk to the flight operations and protect assets but yet the 
person did not meet the criteria, the policy did not fail.  Likely the person did not fail 
either.  Recovery and readiness for change is not black and white as we once thought, 
rather it is more likened to a continuum.  Yes, it is true that the people referenced by 
these leaders did not meet the flight operation or corporation’s criteria, but the 
opportunity could have been enough to start this person on the journey of recovery and 
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even been the seed that would save this person’s life.  What is the role of the policy?  The 
role of the policy can be punitive, it can be risk mitigation, it can be guidance of how to 
handle such events, and it can even be a structure for saving lives.  The motivation for 
creating such a policy varies from flight operation to flight operation and is heavily 
influence by corporate policy and philosophy in this area.  It is entirely possible that the 
policy did not fail either, safeguarding people and assets from harm.  However, there 
exists and opportunity to explore the details of these anecdotal stories so that we have a 
better understanding of how policies did or did not accomplish the goal.  Additionally, 
there exists an opportunity for researchers to explore longitudinally the progress or 
degradation of airmen that have referred to help offered by the employer.  Furthermore 
researchers could explore the components, scope and quality of help provided or 
available to airmen.   
In the qualitative data, some participants reference reliance upon their Employee 
Assistance Programs (EAP).  Future studies could structure questions to allow 
participants to indicate if their organization or flight operation provided access to an EAP 
program encompassing of alcohol and drug issues.  This information could provide 
additional robustness in what resources corporate flight operations have at their disposal.  
This information could also identify the size or type of organization that extends this 
benefit to its employees and those who do not.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
EAP programs are unaware of the FAA requirements that need to be met for pilots to 
return to service.  As a result, numerous additional internal and external resources are 
required for airmen.  This lack of knowledge extends to many flight department leaders 
unaware of the FAA’s requirements to return an airman to duty through a Special 
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Issuance Medical Certificate.  Data collected from the question posed in this survey 
asking participants to rate their familiarity with the HIMS program gives us a glimpse 
into this issue.  Alternatively, flight department leaders could be relatively unfamiliar 
with the resources available through the company’s EAP program.  Additional research 
could investigate flight department leader’s understanding of the resources available to 
them inside their own organizations.  
Although this study did not gain access to many parent company policies to which 
many flight departments defer, enough information was gathered to know that more 
research must be conducted.  It is speculated that the organization may grant flight 
crewmembers unbiased access to assistant programs.  However, most EAP 
representatives and company personnel including the flight department leader are 
unaware of the FAA’s medical requirements for returning someone to duty.  Again this is 
an opportunity for aviation leaders to learn how they may help both the employee and the 
organization by educating upwards.  In order for the process to work, it must include 
additional information gathering and sharing from flight operations, the company and 
potentially the organization’s EAP.  The process must be a collaborative establishment of 
policies that aid the airman while adhering to the cultural standards of the parent 
organization. 
 In verbal conversations with some of the survey participants, leaders indicated 
that they had written an alcohol and drug policy for their flight operation as a result of 
seeking International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO) certification.  
Obtaining IS-BAO certification reflects the highest level of standardized safety practices 
and policies created by the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC).  
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Implementation of an alcohol and drug policy has become a recommend practice by some 
IS-BAO consultants, but is not required to obtain IS-BAO certification.  The wording of 
the written alcohol/drug policies were so similar that it is suspected a template form may 
have been used.  This wording could have been recommended by IS-BAO consultants.  
Further research is needed to determine how the language of these policies was obtained. 
Future research could analyze the scope and robustness of the recommended alcohol and 
drug policy.  It further gives an opportunity to review the IS-BAO process and where 
substance policies fall with regard to making inclusion a required process for 
certification.  The standard practice of some IS-BAO consultants to recommend inclusion 
of a substance policy within flight operations manuals uncovers the fact that this study 
did not ask participants to identify what requirement or event prompted the 
implementation of a particular alcohol and drug policy.  This study did not ask 
participants to indicate when a policy was initiated, if the policy had been amended or 
updated.  The scope of this study did not collect information about whether the policy 
was implemented by the leader, if it was inherited from a previous leader or boss and if 
the policy was voluntarily initiated or mandated.  These questions could be posed in a 
future study. 
Individual leaders each come to the table with biases and prior experiences inside 
and out of the workplace that shape attitudes, opinions and behavior both in how people 
are treated and in the actions or inactions that leaders take to develop policies that seem 
applicable or important for a particular environment.  The resources and scope of this 
research project did not address (both external policy influencing factors and internal 
policy influencing factors) all the life experiences that influence attitudes and ultimately 
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policy (motivators).  Future research could probe leaders regarding experiences external 
to the work environment that influenced 1) Having a policy (of any level) and 2) 
Importance ratings of having a policy (of any level).  Next leaders could be asked they 
created or initiated the implementation of a policy or if it was inherited.  Finally, 
researchers could inquire about the driving factor for policy formation (corporate 
influence, IS-BAO certification, internal and external personal experiences, existence of 
an alcohol/drug issue within flight operations, or having a policy in another 
operation/environment). 
Final Discussion 
In the process of coordinating the receipt of written policies, several flight 
department leaders indicated that their operational policies were currently lean and had 
room for improvement.  Others indicated that written policies were intentionally left 
vague, so as to allow for the leader to exercise judgment based on individual 
circumstances.  Leaders indicated in the discussion section of the survey that they would 
be able to detect substance abuse/dependencies issues among pilots either in the hiring 
process or with their employees.  The reality is that these issues can be incredibly hard to 
detect even to the trained professional.  Written policies that allow for non-punitive self-
disclosure to get help and retain or recover jobs, bring substance abuse and dependence 
issues into the open thereby reducing risk and improving safety of flight operations.   
For many leaders, the issue of whether or not to have an alcohol and drug policy 
in addition to its content, boils down to one of leader control.  If one prefers, this can be 
recharacterized as freedom of choice vs. responsibility of the lives of others (both your 
crews and passengers).  Many people responding to this survey indicated that they 
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wanted to retain their “right” to treat each situation on an individual basis.  There is a 
sense through these statements that these people wish to maintain the freedom of choice 
and control in their flight operation to make moral judgments about the extenuating 
circumstances surrounding a particular person or issue.  Many have a belief system that is 
grounded in the Moral Model of addiction, which is that there is some sort of deficit or 
corruption in the person who is afflicted.  Retaining the “right” to judge the situation is 
guise for judgment of person, taking into account all of the “bad” things addicts and 
abusers do while under the influence (i.e., nobody is going to come in hear and tell me 
how to run MY operation, because I know best.) 
From a humanistic perspective, treating people affected by alcohol and drugs on a 
case by case basis is admirable on its face; however there is a question as to the 
therapeutic nature and motivation for doing so by the leader who wants to retain freedom 
of judgment and views policy as a threat.  Some challenge this perspective and say that 
incorporating a policy is not relinquishing control of the leader’s flight operation, nor 
does it limit freedom of choice.  Instead it is argued that a responsibility exists to treat 
those a leader is responsible for with equally distributed fairness, not potential 
discriminatory influences.  It is also argued leaders have the responsibility to provide 
guidance for those in charge in the event of the leader’s absence regarding what to do to 
protect themselves, passengers and the assets of the organization.   
Employees that present with alcohol and drug issues regularly make poor 
decisions and can exhibit reprehensible behavior.  While the medical community 
officially recognizes substance abuse and dependency within the context of the disease 
model, it is often supremely challenging to separate the behavior of addiction from the 
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actual disease.  These two components are separate, however intertwined they may be.  
When faced with an emotionally charged situation that evoke strong feelings, it is 
difficult not be swayed by these emotions.  Having a policy in place may help mitigate 
the influence of emotionally charged decision making and gives guidance.  Just as having 
an emergency checklist is critical to proper decision making when an aircraft has an 
engine failure, having a robust alcohol and drug policy in place is important for decision 
making for the safety of a flight operations personnel.  Furthermore, this analogy can be 
used in the argument against creating a substance policy because of size or because the 
operation has not encountered such an issue.  While many flight operations never 
experience an engine-out situation, as responsible leader’s and pilots we could rarely 
consider flying without an emergency checklist because the flight operation is too small 
or because an engine-out had never occurred.  Such is the case when considering risk 
mitigation for people and assets in critical decision making on the ground through the 
construction of substance policies.   
The cultural stigmatization and challenges that come with substance abuse and 
dependence parallel those of mental illness and in some cases can be dually occurring, or 
co-morbid.   Kay Redfield Jamison in her memoir, An Unquiet Mind discusses her 
struggle with bipolar disorder as a practicing Psychologist.  An analogous message for 
the airmen who is struggling with substance abuse or dependence can be drawn.  She 
writes,  
“The privilege to practice is exactly that, a privilege; it is not a 
right.  The real dangers, of course, come about from those clinicians (or, 
indeed from those politicians, pilots, businessmen, or other individuals 
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responsible for the welfare of others) who – because of the stigma or the 
fear of suspension of their privileges or expulsion from medical school, 
graduate school, or residency-are hesitant to seek out psychiatric 
treatment.  Left untreated, or unsupervised, many become ill, endangering 
not only their own lives but the lives of others; often, in an attempt to 
medicate their own moods, many doctors will also become alcoholics or 
drug abusers” (Redfield Jamison, 1995). 
The lack of judgment both by the affected airmen and the leaders of flight 
operations is pervasive in a work environment culturally steeped in intolerance.  As a 
result of this intolerance, the industry lacks policy guidance. But ultimately we are not 
really talking about the freedom to control one’s flight operation, to exercise individually 
tailored judgment, retaining airmen privileges or even careers - we are talking about 
saving lives.  Policies give us the guidance to follow a checklist of action that protects the 
people who have lost the ability to protect themselves.  Policies give us the guidance to 
protect our passengers, our assets and finally ourselves insulating us from potential 
litigious action.  At the end of the day, as a leader isn’t that what we are charged with 
doing-leading to protect?  Because we are leaders, it is not about what I feel personally or 
what we want personally, but what is best for all involved. 
Jamison goes on to write, “Hospitals and professional organizations need 
to acknowledge the extent to which untreated doctors, nurses, and 
psychologists present risks to the patients they treat.  But they also need to 
encourage effective and compassionate treatment and work out guidelines 
for safeguards and intelligent, nonpaternalistic supervision.  Untreated 
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mood disorders result in risks not only to patients, but to the doctors 
themselves.  Far too many doctors - many of them excellent physicians - 
commit suicide each year” (Redfield Jamison, 1995). 
Her message can easily be rewritten for the aviation industry regarding substance 
abuse/dependence.  Flight Operations and professional aviation organizations need to 
acknowledge the extent to which untreated aviators, mechanics, and air traffic controllers 
present risks to the people they transport.  Untreated substance abuse and dependence 
produce resulting risks not only to passengers and assets, but to the afflicted professional 
themselves.  Far too many airmen are encouraged to hide their battle with substances and 
are penalized when seeking help which may lead eventually to death. 
Ultimately as clinicians, practitioners, researchers and leaders in the aviation 
community we are trying to identify those flight operations lead by those who are ready 
and require guidance in creating and changing alcohol and drug policies.  There are those 
too who are experiencing ambivalence to change and even those who are do not yet 
recognize that change may be necessary (may be at risk for having an issue in their flight 
operation but do not have any policy or a policy that does not fully support their needs).  
Through this examination of the current state of corporate aviation’s alcohol and drug 
policies we have gotten closer to gauging those flight operations that may fall into these 
categories.  We also have a plethora of opportunities for further research to learn more 
and increase education in the area of alcohol and drug policies, resources and attitudes.  
Combined we have the chance to help an entire aviation community affected by the 
growing presence of alcohol and drugs.
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY EMAIL INVITATION 
Dear Flight Department Leader,  
 
As a graduate student working on my master’s degree in Aviation at the John D. Odegard 
School of Aerospace Sciences at the University of North Dakota, I am seeking your 
industry expertise through a survey for my thesis work. This survey has been specifically 
designed for your operational environment - Business Aviation.  
  
Your time is extremely valuable. This short survey has been limited to 16 questions, 
taking only approximately 10 minutes to complete. Cookies must be enabled on your 
computer to take the survey. Please note, your participation and the answers given will 
remain entirely confidential.  
  
Your opinion and expertise matter. The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the 
nature of air-crew alcohol and drug policies among FAR Part 91 flight operations, 
specifically their prevalence and factors influencing policy composition. Your 
contribution will provide insight and guidance about voluntary, internal policy 
development as well as industry best practices in this particular area. This is your chance 
to voice your opinion and share your expertise regarding what the needs of the industry 
are regarding departmental air-crew alcohol and drug policies.  
  
Your participation is greatly appreciated. Your invitation to participate in this study will 
be valid from October 15-31, 2007. Please click on the following link to complete your 
survey now: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx (Corporate Aviation Alcohol/Drug 
Policy Survey). 
  
Thank you for your contribution. Should you have any questions about the survey or 
encounter any difficulties in completing the survey, please feel free to contact me.  
  
Sincerely,  
  
Johnené Vardiman, Graduate Researcher  
John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences  
University of North Dakota  
johnene.vardiman@und.nodak.edu  
(940) 565-5048  
  
Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from us, please click 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx (here), and you will be automatically 
removed from our mailing list. 
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